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I.

INTRODUCTION

Willis calls the constructive murder doctrine "savage law;" 1 Hogan says
that it never had any useful purpose other than "to satisfy a primitive instinct
for revenge." 2 Common law courts have evinced a consistent policy to restrict
the scope of the doctrine, now culminating in some jurisdictions in its final
abrogation. 3 By the time of its enactment in 1892, the constructive murder pro-
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IComment, Rowev. The King (1951), 29 Can. B. Rev. 784 at 796.
Reform oftheLaw of Homicide (1980), 29 U.N.B. L.J. 9 at 19.
3See notes 30 to 37, infra.
2
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vision in the Canadian CriminalCode was already anomalous. 4 But it has been
significantly expanded by subsequent amendments to the legislation, thereby
creating a general regime of criminal responsibility for accidental or negligent
deaths caused during the commission of specified offences that has been subjected to universal criticism. 5 The pre-1975 regime was Draconian, permitting
no flexibility to deal with circumstances where the risk of death or grievous
bodily harm was comparatively insubstantial. As repugnant as this regime
was, there remained, at least arguably, some coherence to the denominated
underlying offences. In 1975, there was added to the provision a reference to
forcible confinement as an offence during the commission of which one could
be constructively responsible for consequential death. Forcible confinement,
in its present form, 6 is the equivalent of the tort of false imprisonment. It was
the subject of only three reported cases in Canada between 1869 and 19757 and
was the basis of only two prosecutions in England in 1978.8 Notwithstanding
its innocuous status as a principal offence, forcible confinement has now serv4The present provision reads as follows:
213. Culpable homicide is murder where a person causes the death of a human being while committing or attempting to commit high treason or an offence mentioned in section 52 (sabotage), 76 (piratical acts), 76.1 (hijacking an aircraft), 132 or
subsection 133(1) or sections 134 to 136 (escape or rescue from prison or lawful
custody), section 246 (assaulting a peace officer), section 246.1 (sexual assault),
246.2 (sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily
harm), 246.3 (aggravated assault), 247 (kidnapping and forcible confinement), 302
(robbery), 306 (breaking and entering) or 389 or 390 (arson), whether or not the
person means to cause death to any human being and whether or not he knows that
death is likely to be caused to any human being, if
(a) he means to cause bodily harm for the purpose of
(i) facilitating the commission of the offence, or
(ii) facilitating his flight after committing or attempting to commit the offence
and the death ensues from the bodily harm;
(b) he administers a stupefying or overpowering thing for a purpose mentioned
in paragraph (a), and the death ensues therefrom;
(c) he wilfully stops, by any means, the breath of a human being for a purpose
mentioned in paragraph (a), and the death ensues therefrom; or
(d) he uses a weapon or has it upon his person
(i) during or at the time he commits or attempts to commit the offence, or
(ii) during or at the time of his flight after committing or attempting to commit the offence,
and the death ensues as a consequence.
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 213, as am. by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 13 and S.C.
1980-81-82-83, c. 125, s. 15.
5 See Willis, supra note 1; Edwards, Constructive Murderin CanadianandEnglish
Law (1961), 3 Crim. L.Q. 481; Burns and Reid, From Felony Murder to Accomplice
Felony Attempted Murder: The Rake's ProgressCompleat? (1977), 55 Can. B. Rev. 75;
Hooper, Some Anomalies andDevelopments in the Law of Homicide (1967), 3 U.B.C.
L. Rev. 55; Stuart, CanadianCriminalLaw(1982), at 216-19.
6Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34:
247(2) Every one who, without lawful authority, confines, imprisons or forcibly
seizes another person is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years.
7
Cornwallv. The Queen (1872), 33 U.C.Q.B. 106; R. v. Lenton, [1947] O.R. 155,
3 C.R. 41 (C.A.); and R. v. Leech (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 149, [1973] 1 W.W.R. 744
(Alta. S.C.T.D.).
8Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report, Offences Against the
Person (1980), c. 7844, at 98. There were twelve prosecutions in 1977.
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ed as an underlying element in at least five murder convictions in Canada in
the past several years.
This situation has come about primarily through a legislative amendment
process that has been shockingly careless. As well, this unfortunate combination of provisions has been exploited by resourceful, if not overzealous prosecutors and the process has been concluded with the co-operation of
dishearteningly positivistic courts. In the end one finds the determination of
responsibility for murder operating in much the same fashion as a Rube
Goldberg device, where the accused need only have the intention to trip the
lever setting the ball in motion, his ultimate fate depending upon the combination of sprockets and chains, springs, levers and burning wicks built into the
machine by its designer. In this case, however, the designer, Parliament, has
been negligent; the ostensible brakes on the device, the courts, have deferred
from that role and instead have retired to the end of the line, where they pass
sentence if the ball eventually drops through the trap door. Control of the process is thus vested in broad prosecutorial discretion to charge anything from
manslaughter to first degree murder where death ensues while the victim is
confined. Moreover, the courts have no discretion at the sentencing stage as
first degree and second degree murder are punishable by mandatory life imprisonment with mandatory minimum periods before parole eligibility. The
consequence of this combination of Parliamentary failure, prosecutorial zeal
and judicial deference is a radical departure from general subjective principles
of criminal responsibility, marked by a frightening insensitivity to the results
in particular cases.
Furthermore, the ubiquitous nature of confinement as an incidental element of other offences, and the likelihood of confinement occurring in circumstances involving a significantly lower risk of personal violence than
would be normal in a hostage-taking, jeopardize whatever symmetry or rationality may otherwise be found in the scheme of our homicide provisions. It
is a measure of how positivistic our system of criminal justice has become that
the previous point, an aversion to unduly harsh consequences for an individual
accused and a departure from general principles of mens rea, would be unlikely to prevail if it were not for the coincidence of this second point, the perceived threat to the rationality of the system. And even this latter argument has not
often met with favour in the courts.
One example will suffice to demonstrate the problems raised by this unfortunate combination of provisions. In R. v. Dollan and Newstead,9 the two
accused were fleeing from the police. In need of another vehicle, they approached the isolated Kehoe farmhouse during the early morning hours.
Dollan entered with a gun, telling Mrs. Kehoe to lie on the floor. She did not
do so but instead ran into the bedroom with her husband and locked the door.
Dollan order them to come out and attempted to kick the door down but failed. He then fired his shot-gun through the bedroom door, injuring both of the
Kehoes, Mr. Kehoe seriously. Mrs. Kehoe then came out of the bedroom
because Dollan said he would shoot her grandchildren, who were staying with
them. Mrs. Kehoe and the grandchildren were tied up in the living room and
Mr. Kehoe was bound in the bedroom. The accused stole a truck, some money
9(1980), 53 C.C.C. (2d) 146 (Ont. H.C.); appeal dismissed (1981), 65 C.C.C. (2d)
240 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal denied (1982), 42 N.R. 351 (S.C.C.).
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and a weapon and left, returning to the house to rebind Mrs. Kehoe and the
grandchildren who had managed to free themselves. Mr. Kehoe later died
from the shot fired through the bedroom door. Dollan was convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility
for twenty-five years without there being any issue of his intention or
recklessness in causing death or grievous bodily harm. Neither was there any
issue of planning and deliberation. In the end the principal issue was a choice
between competing theories of the defence and the prosecution on the issue of
confinement; the defence argued that the confinement did not commence until
the ropes were applied while the Crown contended that it began before the
fatal shot was fired. Any reasonable person would doubtless wonder that
criminal responsibility bearing the ultimate penal sanction could turn upon a
consideration so patently irrelevant to the causing of Mr. Kehoe's death. Yet
that is the state of our Canadian law of homicide.
This article will trace the statutory evolution of both constructive murder
and forcible confinement. The process by which this unlikely but explosive
combination of provisions has resulted raised serious doubts as to the capacity
or the will of Parliament to enact rational criminal law. An inquiry will also be
made into the elements of the offence of forcible confinement, which has been
little known as an offence in Canada. Because of the way in which the
post-1975 provisions have been exploited by prosecutors and applied by
courts, the consequences are far-reaching. It will be argued that it is possible,
consistent with the legislation as enacted, to bring this combination of provisions within reasonable confines. The arguments to accomplish this limitation
will be outlined. It should be noted at the outset that they lead to a conclusion
that all four cases resulting in murder convictions based on constructive
murder/forcible confinement have been wrongly decided.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE MURDER
The concept of attributing responsibility for murder to an accused person
who neither intended to cause death nor acted recklessly is anomalous in the
general context of criminal law, and ought to be especially so in the case of the
ultimate crime, murder. Although it has always been conceived as exceptional
to the general regime of murder, constructive responsibility has a long history
in the law of homicide and the Canadian CriminalCode has had such a provision since it was first enacted in 1892.10 Since that time, the section has
undergone several changes, resulting in a more severe regime than either the
original enactment or the common law rule. The consequence is that in
specified circumstances, in which the Code stipulates potentially minimal
physical requirements, one may be found guilty of murder notwithstanding a
mental state which amounts to ordinary negligence or even to blameless inadvertence, that is, a pure accident. This is a doctrine which is out of step with
contemporary criminal law and which is very difficult to justify as achieving
any rational objective. Before proceeding to consider Canadian statutory
developments, it would be useful to examine the rule as developed at common
law.
10 S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 228.
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A.

The Common Law Felony-MurderRule
The utility of examining the common law development is twofold: first, it
exposes the background against which the original Canadian Code provision
was developed; and, second, it will show how the common law has evolved
recently to confine the application of the doctrine, while Canadian statute law
has gone conspicuously in the opposite direction.
At common law, the status of felony-murder has always been controversial, as to both its scope and its underlying premises. One recent judicial consideration of the rule gave rise to the observation that "[tihe existence and
scope of the felony-murder doctrine have perplexed generations of law
students, commentators, and jurists in the United States and England." 1 Professor Moreland says the doctrine, which he calls "fundamentally unsound,"
is traceable to the work of Bracton in the thirteenth century.12 Judicial recognition is generally attributed to sixteenth-century cases, but the status or reach of
the principle which emerged from those cases is by no means clear.13 In the
seventeenth century Lord Coke wrote that all killing which resulted from an
unlawful act was murder, 14 but Sir Fitzjames Stephen called this a "monstrous
doctrine" which "rested upon little or no authority." 15 In the eighteenth century Foster 16 formulated a mitigated version of Coke's doctrine to the effect
that the underlying act must be a felony, but this too was said by Stephen to be
"entirely arbitrary."' 17 Given the range of offences which were treated as
felonies in the eighteenth century, Foster's formulation was still an extreme
departure from the general notion of malice aforethought as the mental element of murder. The reach of the constructive doctrine is evidenced by his
qualified reiteration of Coke's illustration:
A. shooteth at the poultry of B., and by accident killeth a man; if his intention was
to steal the poultry, which must be collected from circumstances, it will be murder,
by reason of that felonious intent; but if it was done wantonly, and without that
intention, it will be barely manslaughter. 18
Thus, in Foster's view, if A intended only to kill the hen it would be
manslaughter if he accidentally killed a person, but it would be murder if he
had intended to steal the hen.
11
People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980), at 306 (Mich. Sup. Ct.).
12Moreland, Law of Homicide (1952), at 42.
isLord Dacre's Case (1535), 72 E.R. 458; Mansell and Herbert's Case (1556), 73
E.R. 279. See Kaye, The Early History of Murder andManslaughter,1 (1967), 83 L.Q.
Rev. 568, at 577ff.
14Third Institute, at 56. Coke offers the illustration of a person, meaning to shoot
the hen of another, killing a man by mischance. Such a case would, according to Coke,
be murder.
15A History of the CriminalLawof England(1st ed., 1883), v. 3, at 75 [hereinafter
History].
16Crown Law (2d ed., 1791) at 258-59.
17Supra note 15, at 75. Stephen admits, however, that Foster was preceded in his
views by Hale and Holt; Moreland, supra note 12, at 42, points out that this view was
reiterated by Blackstone, Hawkins and East. For a defence of Foster, although not of
the rule, see Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law (1936), 6 Camb.
L.J. 31, at 41-43 and 55.
18Foster, supranote 16, at 258.
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Whether or not Stephen is correct in his criticism of Foster's precedents,
the latter's formulation came to be the basis of the felony-murder rule, and
Stephen admits that he himself accepted it and acted upon it. 19 It became the
basis of the rule not so much in the sense that it was mechanically applied, but
as a point of reference from which judges and juries through the nineteenth
century sought to move away in an effort to mitigate its harsh effects. Not surprisingly, the most sympathetic circumstances arose in the context of a consensual, non-violent crime: abortion. The nineteenth-century development was
such that by 1898, Bigham J. would instruct a jury in a case of abortion
resulting in death, "If you should be of the opinion that the prisoner could
not, as a reasonable man, expect death to result, you can find a verdict of
manslaughter." 2021 By 1902 Professor Kenny concluded that there was a
"modern trend" to limit the rule and in 1914 Stroud could write, "in the few
cases where it has been possible in recent years to apply the doctrine.., it has
been deliberately and almost invariably departed from, under high judicial
authority. "22

The perceived gains of the nineteenth century were partly undone in 1920
with the decision of the House of Lords in Beard's Case,23 where it was said
that a person could be convicted of murder if death resulted from an act of
violence committed in the course of a felony of violence. This formulation involves a different standard from the view which prevailed in the early part of
the century, that the felonious act had to be one likely to cause death. On the
other hand it contained, in theory at least, two important qualifiers on the
traditional view as styled by Foster: both the felony itself and the act causing
deatti had to be violent. 24 The Beard "test" continued to be the rule 25 in
England until 1957, when constructive malice was abolished by the Homicide
Act, 1957.26 This abolition was undertaken on the recommendation of the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment which concluded:
19
Stephen, supra note 15, at 57 and n. 3.
20
R. v. Whitmarsh (1898), 62 J.P. 711. This case, along with other nineteenthcentury developments, is discussed in Turner, supra note 17, at 55-60.
21 Outlines of CriminalLaw(1st ed., 1902) at 137.
22 Stroud, Mens Rea (1914) at 183. One illustration of the artificial base of the doctrine can be seen in a case discussed by Stroud, in which a burgler broker into a house
and fatally injured himself when he fell into the basement. The jury was instructed that
he could be found guilty of felony-suicide. As Stroud comments: "One can hardly conceive a better reductio ad absurdum." Id. at 169.
23 Directorof PublicProsecutionsv. Beard, [1920] A.C. 479. For a criticism of the
House of Lords' decision see Turner, supra note 17. Professor Turner says the decision
"nullified all the progress in improving the law of murder which has been achieved during the past century" and prevented "the further logical and humane development of
the law of homicide." Id. at 64 and 65.
2 In one post-Beard case, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the use of a
loaded firearm in order to frighten the victim into submission was by itself a violent act,
hence it was no response to say that the trigger was squeezed inadvertently. R. v. Jarmain (1945), 31 Cr. App. R. 39, [1946] 1 K.B. 74.
25 There were three noteworthy post-Beard cases: R. v. Betts and Ridley (1930), 22
Cr. App. R. 148; R. v. Stone, [1937] 3 All E.R. 920, 53 T.L.R. 1046; andR. v. Jarmain,
supra note 24. See discussion in Kenny's Outlines of CriminalLaw (19th ed., 1958), at

146ff.

265 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, s. 1(1), the marginal note of which reads: "Abolition of 'constructive malice' ":
I. -(1) Where a person kills another in the course or futherance of some other offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same
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107. We have no doubt that, as a matter of general principle, persons ought not be
punished for consequences of their acts which they did not intend or foresee. The
doctrine of constructive malice clearly infringes this principle and in our view it
ought to be abolished. 27
The Commission, in 1949, viewed the pre-Beard doctrine as being limited to
cases in which the felonious act was likely to cause death, thereby coming
within the traditional view of murder in any event. The post-Beardstate of the
28
law was characterized as "uncertain."
In the United States, 29 the doctrine has been taken to significantly greater
lengths at common law than has been the case in England, going so far at one
point as to convict a person of murder when a third party was shot and killed
by police officers who pursued the accused from the scene of a robbery. 30 In a
second Pennsylvania case, the accused was convicted of murder when a coconspirator accidentally killed himself during the commission of the felony of
arson. 31 These cases, in a decision typical of a general trend to reduce the reach
of the felony-murder doctrine in America, have subsequently been overruled
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which acknowledged that the rule had
been subjected to harsh criticism, "most of it thoroughly warranted." 32 The
Court undertook a comprehensive review of the rule and, while denying that it
was necessary to abolish it in the instant case, made considerable effort to
malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to
amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another offence.
See Prevezer, The English HomicideAct (1957), 57 Colum. L. Rev. 624, at 633-36.
27(1949-53), Cmd. 8932 (1953), at 40. The Commissioners undertook a thorough
review of the existing lav in England and reached the following conclusion:
85. So far as we are aware, the doctrine that any killing in the course of the commission of any felony is murder has never been expressly overruled by the courts;
and judicial witnesses gave it as their opinion that in strict theory this was probably
still the law. They hastened to add, however, that in practice it had been dead for
many years, and that if the killing was unintentional a modern Judge would direct
the jury to bring in a verdict of manslaughter unless the felony was one involving
violence. But although it may be accepted that the old rule in its full rigour is no
longer in practice applied by courts, it is not easy to formulate accurately the scope
of the rule as it is now applied .... [W]hile we cannot speak with certainty, a
reasonable conclusion seems to be that a person is now guilty of murder only if the
act from which death results in the course or in furtherance of such a felony is an
act
28 of violence (at 31-32).
Id. at 30.
29For American academic comment, which is universally critical, see: Fletcher,
Rethinking CriminalLaw (1978), at 290 et seq.; Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder
(1980-81), 12 Southwestern U.L. Rev. 413; Note, The Felony-MurderRule: In Search
of a Viable Doctrine (1978), 23 Cath. Lawyer 133; Note, The CaliforniaSupreme Court
Assaults the Felony-MurderRule (1970), 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1059; Note, Felony Murder
as a FirstDegree Offence: An AnachronismRetained (1957), 66 Yale L.J. 427; Annotation, What Felonies are Inherently or Foreseeably Dangerous? (1973), 50 A.L.R. 3d
397.
30
Commonwealth v. Almeida, 68 A.2d 595 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1949).
31Commonwealth v. Bolish, 113 A.2d 464 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1955). See comment by
Morris, The Felon'sResponsibilityfor the LethalActs of Others (1956), 105 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 50. These cases were reconsidered by the Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v.
Redline, 137 A.2d 472 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1958) and, although the Court did not overrule
them, it was clear that there was no intention to further extend the doctrine, this time to
a situation
where a co-felon was killed by pursuing police officers.
32
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550 (1970), at 553.
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demonstrate its shaky underlying foundation, concluding that it ought not to
be extended beyond the bounds it had always known. The movement to
restrain the common law rule was such in the United States that by 1959 the
American Law Institute could list seven limitations which had been judicially
imposed.3 3 Professor Perkins wrote in 1969 that American courts apply the
doctrine "where the law requires, but they do so grudgingly and tend to
restrict its application where circumstances permit." ' 34 The momentum has
continued over the past decade with the general recognition that the felony
must be itself inherently dangerous to human life. 35 In Massachusetts it has
recently been held that the prosecution must prove the defendant's "conscious
disregard of the risk to human life."' 36 The logical conclusion of this judicial
trend to restrict the scope of felony-murder has recently been reached in
Michigan, where the Supreme Court has now abrogated the rule entirely from
the common law of that state.
Whatever reasons can be gleaned from the dubious origin of the felony-murder
rule to explain its existence, those reasons no longer exist today. Indeed, most
states, including our own, have recognized the harshness and inequity of the rule
as is evidenced by the numerous restrictions placed on it. The felony-murder doctrine is unnecessary and in many cases unjust in that it violates the 37basic premise of
individual moral culpability upon which our criminal law is based.
33
Model PenalCode, Tentative DraftNo. 9 (1959),
34
Perkins, CriminalLaw(2d ed., 1969), at 44.
35

at 37.

See the offence of false imprisonment held to be not inherently dangerous to
human life in People v. Henderson,560 P.2d 1180 (Calif. Sup. Ct. 1977); State v. Harrison, 564 P.2d. 1321 (New Mex. Sup. Ct. 1977). See Annotation, What FeloniesareInherently orForeseeablyDangerous?(1973), 50 A.L.R. 3d 397.
36 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982); Commonwealth v. Moran,
442 N.E.2d 399 (1982). See also State v. Millette, 299 A.2d 150 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1972)
holding that allegation and proof of malice were necessary in any murder prosecution,
including where death was caused during the commission of a felony, in this instance
abortion.
37
People v. Aaron, supra note 11, at 328. For comments on People v. Aaron, see
Common-law Felony Murder Doctrine Judicially Abolished in Michigan (1982), 60
Wash. U. L.Q. 1197; Comment (1982), 59 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 428; Comment, Michigan
Supreme Court Uproots the Felony Murder Rule (1981), 50 U.M.K.C.L. Rev. 112;
Comment, Demise of the Felony Murder Doctrine in Michigan (1981), 28 Wayne L.
Rev. 215; Annotation, Judicial Abrogation of Felony-Murder Doctrine (1982), 13
A.L.R. 4th 1226. The California Supreme Court has recently reconsidered the felonymurder doctrine. Because first-degree felony-murder for certain underlying offences is
provided for by statute, the Court did not feel it had the same jurisdiction to abrogate
the doctrine as did the Michigan Court in Aaron. In People v. Dillon, 194 Cal. Rptr.
390 (1983), the Court declined to override the legislation, but stated clearly that it held
" no brief" for the felony-murder rule (at 402). The Court went on to hold that the firstdegree felony-murder rule violates the State constitution's "cruel and unusual punishment" provision by providing for a sentence of life imprisonment (with eligibility for
parole). As for the likelihood that the second-degree felony-murder rule will be judicially abrogated (it is not statutory in California), Chief Justice Bird said in a concurring
opinion: "In view of the criticisms that this Court and others have leveled against the
rule over the past decade, the time seems to be at hand for doing away with that portion
of the "barbaric" anachronism which we are responsible for creating." (at 424).
The Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court has recently rejected an argument that the constructive murder provisions of the Criminal Code violate ss. 11(d) and
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Bezanson v. The Queen
(unreported, Dec. 6, 1983). A similar argument will be made to the P.E.I. Supreme
Court in Laviollette v. The Queen, to be heard in early 1984.
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In Australia, the various states have a mix of common law and statutory
felony-murder regimes. The present common law rule is said by Professor Colin Howard to be narrower in scope than the statutory regimes. Professor
Howard details developments under the common law regimes that show that
there exists at least a potential for further restriction of the law. He adds that
this is a disparity which he says is likely to increase rather than diminish due to
"the erosion of the felony-murder rule which is always possible at common
38
law.''
Thus, it can be seen that the Canadian constructive murder provision was
enacted in 1892 against a backdrop of English case law tending increasingly to
restrict the operation of felony-murder, and that it has been subsequently cast
in a still more dubious light by the undeniable tendency of common law courts
to confine the doctrine and ultimately to abrogate it.
B.

The CanadianStatutoryRegime
The Canadian Criminal Code of 1892 was the culmination of a halfcentury of proposals to codify the criminal law of England. 39 What has come
to be known as the constructive murder provision in the Canadian Code was
taken, with only minor changes, directly from the Draft Code prepared by the
English Criminal Code Commission of 1878-79. 40 The pre-eminent force
behind the English Draft Code was Sir Fitzjames Stephen who, by his own admission, had "been led by circumstances to consider this matter more frequently and in greater detail than any previous writer upon it."' 41 The 1879
Commissioners' Report was produced in the space of seven months and was
basically a reiteration of an 1878 draft bill that Stephen had personally
written. 42 It is curious that the Draft Code contained a constructive murder
38

Howard, CriminalLaw(4th ed., 1982), at 70.

39See: Crouse, A Critique of Canadian Criminal Legislation (1934), 12 Can. B.

Rev. 542; Edwards, supra note 5, at 483-87; Hooper, supranote 5.
40 C. 2345 (1879). The provision appeared in the 1879 Draft Code as s. 175. The only
change in the wording of s. 228 of the Canadian CriminalCode was the substitution of
"injury" for "violence" in the phrase "and death ensues from such injury" in S.C.
1892, c. 29, s. 228(a):
228. Culpable homicide is also murder in each of the following cases, whether the
offender means or not death to ensue, or knows or not that death is likely to ensue:
(a) If he means to inflict grievous bodily injury for the purpose of facilitating the
commission of any of the offences in this section mentioned, or the flight of the offender upon the commission or attempted commission thereof, and death ensues
from such injury; or
(b) If he administers any stupefying or overpowering thing for either of the purposes aforesaid, and death ensues from the effects thereof; or
(c) If he by any means wilfully stops the breath of any person for either of the
purposes aforesaid, and death ensues from such stopping of the breath.
2. The following are the offences in this section referred to: Treason and the other
offences mentioned in Part IV of this Act, piracy and offences deemed to be
piracy, escape or rescue from prison or lawful custody, resisting lawful apprehension, murder, rape, forcible abduction, robbery, burglary, arson.
41 Supra note 15, v. 3, at 19, n. 1. See Radzinowicz, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen
1829-1894 and His Contributionto the Development of CriminalLaw, [1957] Seldon
Society Lectures at 20-22. The other members of the Commission were Lord Blackburn,
Lush42L.J. and Barry J.
Supra note 15, v. 3, at 79-83; Edwards, supra note 5, at 485. Stephen writes: "By
far the greater part both of the Code and of the Report was my own composition."
Supranote 15, at 349.
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provision at all because neither of Stephen's proposed bills of 1874 or 1878
contained such a provision and constructive malice had been generally out of
favour with predecessor Commissions studying the criminal law. 43 Moreover,
Stephen himself was in the vanguard of scholarly and, later, judicial efforts to
restrict the scope of the doctrine. As seen above, he was critical of Foster's rule
as being "cruel and monstrous." In 1874 he argued that there ought to be a
restriction of the rule to cases where the felonious act was itself dangerous to
life. 44 After his appointment to the bench, he gave a jury instruction in R. v.
Sernd which is the leading example of late nineteenth-century judicial reform
of the rule. The case involved a death resulting from an incident of arson and
Stephen addressed the felony-murder charge in this way:
In my opinion the definition of the law which makes it murder to kill by an act
done in the commission of a felony might and ought to be narrowed .... I think
that, instead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony and which
causes death amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to say that any act known
to be dangerous to life, and likely in itself to cause death, done
45 for the purpose of
committing a felony, which caused death, should be murder.

This is the instruction which led a report to the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment to comment that, given Sernd and its contemporaries, "it might
46
have been thought . . . that the doctrine would gradually wither away." It
was at least perceived as an illustration of a judicial tendency to exclude cases
47
of accidental and unforeseeable death from the constructive murder doctrine.
It is difficult to reconcile these expressions of opposition to felony-murder
with the inclusion of section 228 in the Draft Code. Stephen states in his
History that a comparison of section 228 with the previous common law view
demonstrates "the extent to which the commissioners proposed to contract the
[common law] definition." 48 No doubt it does constitute a reduction in scope
of Foster's view that any death caused during the commission of a felony is
murder. It does so in two ways: first, by specifying underlying offences, and
second, by specifying three types of conduct causing death. However, it must
be emphasized that the provision only contractsthe common law rule and does
not eliminate it. In light of the exclusion of felony-murder from Stephen's
earlier drafts and his general opposition to the doctrine, it is likely that
something arose in the deliberations of the 1879 Commission which either
changed his view or which caused the other Commissioners to prevail.
The explanation can probably be traced to the efforts of the Commission
to deal with a specific hard case, known as "the Fordingbridge murder." ' 49 In
that case the accused attempted to ravish a victim, described by the author of
the Commissioners' Report as "an innocent girl on her way to church," and,
43

Hooper, supranote 5, at 74.

44 Testimony before the Select Committee appointed in 1874 to consider the pro-

posed bill: Minutes of Evidence, 3 et seq. See Wechsler and Michael, A Rationaleof the
Law of Homicide: 1(1937), 37 Colum. L. Rev. 701, at 703.
45

R. v. Sernd and Goldfinch (1887), 16 Cox C.C. 311, at 313. Upon this direction

the jury acquitted, although subsequently the accused were prosecuted successfully for
arson. See Stroud, supranote 22, at 178.
46Report, supra note 27, Appendix 7(b) at 386.
47

Id.at 30.

48 Supra note 15,
49

at 83.
R. v. Gilbert, The Times, 19 July 1862. The case is discussed in the Report of the

Commissioners (1879), c. 2345, at 24 and in Stephen, supranote 15, at 83-84.
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while dragging her off toward the woods, stuffed her shawl in her mouth to
prevent her from crying out, thereby causing her death from suffocation. The
defence of the accused to a charge of intentional murder would, according to
Stephen, be that he could not have intended to cause death as that would
frustrate his purpose which was to rape the girl. The Report comments, "and
we believe there are few who would not think the law defective if such an offence was not murder." 50 In his History, Stephen says that calling such an act
murder would be "in harmony with the common standard of moral feeling"
and that the provision accomplishes its purpose of describing "in perfectly
unambiguous language all the worst and most dangerous cases of homicide." ' 51
In light of the provision as it appeared in the Draft Code, with two subsections
devoted expressly to stopping the breath of a victim and the administration of
stupefying things, it is quite likely that the inclusion of section 228 in the
Criminal Code can be explained as "the Fordingbridge murder" section,
designed to mollify the sense of revulsion of the Commissioners that an accused could explain his lack of intention to kill by pleading his intention to rape.
An accused person who did not intend to have sexual intercourse with the victim but who attacked her maliciously and caused her to suffocate would be
guilty of murder.
The objection to permitting an intention to rape as a defence to murder is
understandable. However, the drafters went further than to state a policy prohibiting such a defence in cases where the jury could otherwise conclude from
the circumstances that the accused intended to cause death or grievous bodily
harm. Instead of leaving the initial inquiry with the jury and hence putting the
burden on the prosecution to prove the culpable mental state of the accused,
the Code provision effectively created an irrebuttable presumption that in certain circumstances the accused would have a priori the intent to cause death
because he undertook the dangerous enterprise of the underlying offence. In
styling the issue so broadly the Commissioners went beyond what was
necessary to meet the case cited by Stephen. The contrast between the general
regime of intentional murder and the constructive murder section caused Professor Turner to remark that the sections were "clumsily drafted." 52 His
analysis of the resulting "confusion of mutually repugnant principles" is that
it could have been prevented by "a clearer recollection of the distinction between evidence and law." 5 3 This criticism treats the provision not as a public
policy against certain defences, nor as a separate definition of murder
characterized by its repugnance to a common moral standard, but as a
predetermination of defined situations in which the risks are such that the
legislature can fix the intention of the accused based on the existence of
prescribed factors. This might be seen as a form of "enterprise liability,"
whereby the Legislature presumes malice or an equivalent mental state given
certain objective circumstances which infer culpability in relation to consequential death. What Professor Turner perceives in the contradiction of subjective and objective principles in the homicide provisions is an attempt by the
Commissioners, and later the legislature, to substitute their view for that of the
jury on the issue of the accused's guilty intent. In light of the approach of the
Commissioners in working back from a hard case to drafting Code provisions,
50
51

52

Report, id.
Supra note 15, at 84.

Russell on Crime(1 th ed., 1958), v. 1, at 532.

53Id.at 533.
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his criticism is an accurate one. The initial lack of underlying principle is unfortunate, not so much because of the danger which the 1892 provision posed
but because the draft Code thus furnished a precarious base, a base upon
which subsequent amendments to the constructive murder provision have built
in such a fashion as to expand it geometrically beyond the scope of the facts of
the Fordingbridge murder.
While the 1892 provision was, in theory, a regime of constructive intention, it did not in fact expand by a great degree the basic regime of intentional
murder. Subsection (a) required an intention to inflict grievous bodily injury,
prompting Stephen to comment that he was not sure that it added anything of
importance to the intentional murder provision.5 4 Subsection (c) required the
willful stopping of breath and subsection (b), in prescribing the administration
of a stupefying thing, focused upon an act in which the risk of death was by
definition very high and where it would have to be proven that the accused had
mens rea in relation to the administration of the drug. But subsection (a) was
amended in 1953 to drop the reference to "grievous" bodily harm, so that the
accused need now intend only to cause "bodily harm." 55 The change is significant in light of Stephen's view that subsection (a) added nothing to intentional
murder. It was not, however, debated by Parliament, nor was it apparently
deliberated by the Royal Commission established to revise the Code. 56 A
subsequent explanation by Senator Hayden has been characterized as
"thoroughly unconvincing." 5 7 In any event, it is likely that subsections (b) and
(c) are now subsumed by the overbroad provisions of the amended subsection
(a).
Still more consequential is the addition in 1947 of subsection (d), adding a
fourth type of death-causing conduct, this time:
(d) if he uses or has upon his person any weapon during or at the time of the commission or attempted commission by him of any of the offences in this section
mentioned or the flight of the offender upon the commission
5 8 or attempted commission thereof, and death ensues as a consequence of its use.

Like the initial introduction of the constructive murder provision, this amendment was undertaken to respond to a specific case, in this instance R. v.
Hughes59 , in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that the accidental
discharge of a firearm during the commission of a robbery did not come within
the pre-1947 regime. This amendment too was undertaken without Parliamentary deliberation and the consequence is described by John Willis as "savage
and incoherent." 60As bad as the 1947 amendment may have been, the section
was made still more draconian in the 1955 Revision of the Code when the
words "of its use" were dropped from subsection (d), again without any ex5

4Supra note 15, at 83.

5

S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 202. For comments on the amendments to the provision
see Hooper, supra note 5, at 74-77; Stuart, supra note 5, at 216-19; Burns and Reid,
supra56note 5, at 83-87.
Hooper, supranote 5, at 74.
5
7Stuart, supra note 5, at 218.
58 S.C. 1947, c. 55, s. 7.
59 [1942] S.C.R. 517, 78 C.C.C. 257.
60 Supra note 1, at 793. Willis argues that the amendment should be repealed.
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planation for the change. 61 By this modification the constructive murder provision, at least where death was caused by a weapon, was expanded to encompass the most purely accidental of killings. There could no longer be said to be
any controls on the operation of the provision to prescribe at least some
minimal relation between the intention of the accused and the ensuing death.
After the 1955 amendment the only hope that the provision would not exceed all imaginable limits lay in the prescience of Parliament in the specification of underlying offences. It could at least have been hoped that the list of
offences would be restricted to those in which malicious disregard for the life
of a victim was inherent in the offence itself. However, the futility of such a
hope was already underscored by the existence in the provision since 1892 of a
number of offences which are not inherently dangerous to human life, notably
treason and arson, to name only two. Moreover, there was nothing in the
Parliamentary treatment of the provision prior to 1955 to encourage one to
believe that the existing list of underlying offences would be reconsidered,
although that was not to say that it might not be expanded.
In 1975 Parliament again amended section 213, this time to add references
to sabotage and hijacking as underlying offences. Again there was little discussion in Parliamentary Committee of the change. The only statement was that
of Mr. Fox, who moved the amendment before the Standing Committee on
Justice and Legal Affairs, where he commented:
The basic purpose of this amendment is to add reference to Section 76 [sabotage]

and 76.1 [hijacking] to the provisions of the Criminal Code, that is Section 213
which deals with constructive murder. 62

There were no questions on the amendment and it was passed without further
discussion. Neither was there recognition of the added reference to attempted
rape.63

Similarly, there was no discussion of the introduction for the first time of
specific references to the underlying offences to accord by number with
substantive prohibitions in the Code. Prior to 1975, the underlying offences
were listed by name only. Each accorded with a substantive provision by the
same name, with two exceptions: burglary and forcible abduction. The issue of
what was meant by the reference to burglary came before the Supreme Court
in R. v. Popovic64 and occasioned a major exercise in statutory interpretation
by Pigeon J. The conclusion of the majority of the Court was that "burglary"
in section 213 did not refer to the modern offence of breaking and entering.
Although the matter was not raised in Committee discussion it is likely that the
61 See Sedgwick, The New Criminal Code: Comments and Criticisms (1955), 33
Can. B. Rev. 63, at 71.
62
Standing Comm. on Justice and Legal Affairs, Proceedings, 1974-76, 33:15. The
added
reference to sabotage is in s. 52, not in s. 76 as indicated by Mr. Fox.
63
Likely added because rape was the only one of the thirteen underlying offences in
s. 213 which had an independent attempt provision. Attempts to commit the other substantive offences would be covered by the opening words of s. 213. Note that there is no
longer an offence of attempted rape, as s. 143 has been repealed by S.C. 1980-81-82-83,
c. 125, s. 6.
64 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 308, 25 C.C.C. (2d) 161; aff'g sub nom R. v. Govedarov (1974),
3 O.R. (2d) 23, 16 C.C.C. (2d) 238 (C.A.).
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concordance of the references in section 213 with specific Code provisions was
designed to clarify the issue raised in Popovic.
In listing the offences by section number, forcible confinement was named
for the first time as an underlying offence. Prior to 1975, the reference was to
forcible abduction, but there was no such offence in the Code. The new
reference is to ".

.

. [s.]247 (kidnapping or forcible confinement) ...." Given

the obscurity of the reference to "forcible abduction" as it appeared prior to
1975, it would have appeared unlikely that Parliament would be moved to
amend it. It may be that the drafter who was asked to clear up the confusion
found in Popovicdid not consider the disparity between kidnapping and forcible confinement and automatically accorded the previous reference to forcible
abduction with all offences in section 247. Without the benefit of a more complete explanation by Mr. Fox, the change in the provision is presumably inadvertent.
In the 1879 Draft Code, from which the original constructive murder provision was adopted, there were three offences of abduction: abduction of a
woman against her will, abduction of a woman under twenty-one against
parents' will, and abduction of a girl under sixteen. Therefore, if one is seeking
to determine the original framers' intent it could hardly be said that forcible
confinement was contemplated by the reference to forcible abduction. Even if
one were to assume the relevant point in time to be 1892, when offences of
forcible confinement and kidnapping were adopted into the Code from Canadian legislation, a strong case could not be made for equating forcible abduction with forcible confinement. At best forcible abduction might have been
argued to mean kidnapping. The French version of the Criminal Code prior to
1975 used the word "rapt" in section 213 as a counterpart to "forcible abduction" in the English version. The dictionary, Petit Robert, defines "rapt" as
"Enl~vement illdgal (d'une personne)... Kidnapping (ou kidnappage)." The
learned commentator Ir~n~e Lagarde makes the following criticism of the
French version of kidnapping in section 247, which is translated as "enl~vement":
Version frangaise du mot "kidnapping":
Le legislateur a traduit le mot
semble qu'il aurait
65 "kidnapping" par enl~vement. I1
fallu le traduire par <(rapt>>.

Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England dealt with two offences against persons which constituted "infringements of their natural
liberty." The first of these was false imprisonment, which he equated to "a
mere civil injury." The second offence, that of kidnapping, was described as
"the forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman or child." ' 66 Finally, as a matter of an understanding of the words as used in their ordinary
sense, confinement and abduction are certainly not synonymous; if anything
they are inconsistent and probably contradictory.
Whatever the intended scope of forcible abduction in the pre-1975 version
of section 213, there was apparently never a murder prosecution based on the
provision. The latest change, however, has not passed the attention of Crown
65

Droit PenalCanadien(2d ed.) at 677.

664 BI. Comm. at 217-18 (emphasis added).
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prosecutors, as there have since been at least four prosecutions in which a
murder conviction has been based upon an intention to commit forcible confinement.
Thus we have the appalling evolution of our present constructive murder
provision. Introduced to meet concerns regarding the probability of obtaining
a conviction in a single hard case, it has been subjected to a series of
undeliberated amendments which have invariably expanded the scope of the
doctrine, some of these amendments being patently inadvertent. With the introduction of forcible confinement as an underlying offence we are now faced
with the prospect of seeing an irrational, but at least initially confined, exception swallow the rule.
III. FORCIBLE CONFINEMENT
As the so-called "forcible" confinement provision now appears in the
Criminal Code it can be stripped down to the following: "every one who,
without lawful authority, confines ...

another person .

. . ."

It will be im-

mediately apparent that this provision bears a strong resemblance to the tort of
false imprisonment. Primafacieit covers any restraint of liberty, and the mental element is remarkably elusive. There is no question of there being a requirement of force, hence the "forcible" adjective is without meaning. The inclusion of such a prohibition in the Criminal Code raises problems on several
levels. First, by proscribing "confinement" we criminalize in a single provi67
sion conduct which could include anything from sending a child to his room
to the most odious hostage-taking. Second, by prohibiting conduct which may
occur in circumstances where the accused has no malicious intention toward
the victim we introduce difficult analytical problems for triers of fact. Finally,
and most significantly, the inclusion of forcible confinement as an underlying
offence in the constructive murder provision opens up great potential for prosecutorial abuse and seriously undermines whatever measure of rationality the
homicide provisions may have had before the 1975 amendment. Before
discussing how forcible confinement and constructive murder operate in combination it is important to understand the history and the elements of the
underlying offence.
A. StatutoryDevelopment
At common law, false imprisonment is both a crime and a tort.
Blackstone says:
We are next to consider the violation of the right of personal liberty. This is effected by the injury of false imprisonment, for which the law has not only decreed

a punishment, as a heinous public crime, but has also given a private reparation to

the party .... To constitute the injury of false imprisonment there are two points
requisite;
68 (1) the detention of the person; and, (2) the unlawfulness of such deten-

tion.

The related offence of kidnapping is considered to be an aggravated form of
forcible confinement. 69 In Canada, forcible confinement and kidnapping were
67

Barring a defence under s. 43 of the CriminalCode.
BI. Comm. at 127.

683
69

Russell on Crime(12th ed., 1964), v. 1 at 692.
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first made offences in federal legislation in 1869. That provision, which was
carried forward in essentially the same form in the 1892 Criminal Code, had a
similar format to the present section 247, but the offence of forcible confinement was significantly different from its present styling. It was incorporated
into a single provision called "kidnapping":
264. Everyone is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to seven years' imprisonment who, without lawful authority, forcibly seizes and confines or imprisons any other person within Canada, or kidnaps any other person with intent -

(a.) to cause such other person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in Canada
against his will; or
(b.) to cause such other person to be unlawfully sent or transported out of Canada
against his will; or
to be sold or captured as a slave, or in any way held
(c.) to cause such other person
70
to service against him will.

It will be seen that the provision includes three separate offences: (i) to forcibly seize and confine, (ii) to forcibly seize and imprison, and (iii) to kidnap.
A literal reading of the provision would imply that the required intent referred
to in (a), (b) or (c) had to be proven in relation to any of these offences. The
issue of whether it was necessary to allege the specified intentions for confine-7
ment as well as for kidnapping arose in an 1872 case, Cornwallv. The Queen, 1
in which the accused had been charged with both offences but the intent was
only alleged for the kidnapping. The conviction for the confinement was
reversed, with the divided appeal court holding two to one that the specified
intents had to be proved. It is not surprising to find disagreement on the point
as it is arguable that subsection (a) is redundant while (b) and (c) are inconsistent with the notion of confinement.
In any event, the same provision was initially enacted into the 1892 Code.
In a number of amendments to the Code in 1900, the forcible confinement
provision was separated from the kidnapping provision so that the specified
intentions were no longer requisite for confinement. 72 It ought to be noted that
the same punishment, a maximum term of seven years, was retained for both
offences, giving rise to an implication that there was no Parliamentary intention to create a lesser offence. Given the ambiguous relationship between the
act of confinement and the previously stipulated intentions, it would not be
surprising if the change were perceived as merely editorial. Unhappily, one is
left to speculate as to the intention of Parliament in modifying the provision as
there was no debate during clause-by-clause study. 73
Whatever the purpose of the 1900 amendment may have been it was clearly
a more legitimate procedure than the next modification of section 264, which
was not passed by Parliament but was accomplished by the Commissioners of
the 1906 Revised Statutes of Canada. The 1900 amendment was worded "forcibly seizes and confines or imprisons." After the 1906 Revision it read "forcibly seizes or confines or imprisons." 74 The mandate of the Commissioners in
70
S.C.
7

72

1869, c. 20, s. 69.
Supra note 7.

S.C. 1900, c. 46, s. 3.
May 7, 1900, at 4719.

73 Can. H. of C. Deb.,
74

R.S.C. 1906, c. 146, s. 297(b).

1983]

ForcibleConfinement and ConstructiveMurder

revising the statutes was to make such alterations in the language as were requisite in order to provide a uniform mode of expression or to make minor
amendments to bring out more clearly what they deemed to be the intention of
Parliament. 75 The Commissioners could hardly have considered the 1906 version to be grammatically superior to its predecessor as it was clearly a
retrograde step in terms of style. As for bringing out more clearly the intention
of Parliament, the 1900 amendment was unambiguous, making it an offence
to forcibly seize and confine or imprison another. 76 The result of this alteration, which must have been a clerical error, was to convert what was formerly
a serious offence against the person requiring forcible seizure and confinement
into a considerably more tenuous prohibition equivalent to false imprisonment. The punishment remained seven years until, in 1909, the maximum
penalty for both kidnapping and "forcible" confinement was increased to
twenty-five years. 77 The provision remained unchanged until the 1953 re-

enactment, when it was re-ordered to impose a grammatically improved version of the post-1906 provision with its superfluous "or," so that the section
now reads "confines, imprisons or forcibly seizes." 78 It is likely that the
drafter who spotted the stylistic problem also recognized a seeming disparity
between the offences in the two subsections, which disparity arose solely as a
result of the substitution of "or" and "and" in the 1906 Revision. Unfortunately, instead of going back to examine the Canadian legislative origins of
the provision he must have referred to the English common law and concluded
that these were the old offences of kidnapping and false imprisonment. Had he
referred to the predecessor sections in the Criminal Code and before that
under federal legislation, he would have found that false imprisonment had
never been an offence under Canadian legislation and that the most recent
enactment of Parliament had provided for two offences which were not kidnapping and false imprisonment but which in fact were kidnapping and what
might popularly be called hostage-taking.
As a consequence of this unhappy process we now have a legislative
scheme which proscribes one of the most odious of crimes, hostage-taking,
with a five year maximum punishment, while we attach the same consequence
to a simple false imprisonment. Because it is generally possible for the prosecution to combine a forcible confinement charge with other offences, such as extortion or a firearms offence, the problem seemingly caused by such a low
maximum punishment for hostage-taking is not so repugnant. Moreover, an
element of asportation would permit a charge of kidnapping. 79 The more
serious concern is with the lower end of the spectrum, false imprisonment,
especially as it underlies the constructive murder provision.
75

An Act Respecting the Revised Statutes of Canada,S.C. 1903, c. 61, s. 3.

76In R. v. Lenton, supra note 7, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed a convic-

tion where the victim had been confined but not seized. The Court concluded that the
provision was worded "in the alternative," which is not surprising given the abundance
of "or"
's in the section.
77
S.C. 1909, c. 9, s. 2. On the matter of the continued use of the qualifier "forcible" in relation to the confinement, see R. v. Gourgon and Knowles (1979), 19 C.R.
(3d) 272 (B.C.C.A.), where MacFarlane J.A. observed (at 279): "While it may be unimportant for the purposes of this appeal, I think it was error to treat the confinement in-

volved
in ss. 214(5) and 247(2) as meaning forcible confinement."
78
S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 233(2). This amendment, like the others, passed clause-byclause study uncommented. Can. H. of C.Deb., Feb. 26, 1954, at 2480-82.
79

See discussion inR. v. Oakley (1977), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 436 (Alta. C.A.).
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The Elements of the Offence

The mental element of an offence which is so simply styled as "everyone
who confines" ought not, in a sophisticated system of criminal jurisprudence,
to be difficult to articulate. Being a criminal prohibition which is not of a
regulatory or public welfare character, one says instinctively that the mental
component is mens rea in relation to each of the physical elements of the
crime. 80 And the physical element is simply defined as total restraint of liberty.S1
Two issues then remain: first, what is mens rea, and, second, how does one
determine whether the accused had it? Neither of these issues will be any more
easily resolved in the context of a prohibited act which is not necessarily morally
wrong, or malum in se, and which may occur in circumstances in which the
purpose of the accused is, by any standard, innocent.
Dealing with the issue of what constitutes mens rea, it is best to begin in a
negative sense by excluding negligent conduct. As was said by the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie:
Where the offence is criminal, the Crown must establish a mental element, namely,
that the accused who committed the prohibited act did so intentionally or recklessly,
with knowledge of the facts constituting the offence, or with wilful blindness
toward them. Mere negligence is excluded from the concept of the mental element
required for conviction. 82
To exclude negligence is to deny a conviction based on an objective assessment
of what the accused should have done or known in the circumstances.
Recklessness is, by definition, advertent or conscious. 8 3 It consists of acting in
spite of a subjective awareness of risk. 84 So a successful prosecution must show
80

R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie [19781 2 S.C.R. 1299, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353, at 1303
(S.C.R.), 357 (C.C.C.): "In the case of true crimes there is a presumption that a person
should not be held liable for the wrongfulness of his act if that act is without mensrea."
81
Bird v. Jones (1845), 115 E.R. 668. For a recent application of "total physical
restraint" in a forcible confinement prosecution, see R. v. Locke (1981), 63 C.C.C. (2d)
473 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
The requirement of "total physical restraint" does not mean, however, that the victim must be stationary. See Wade v. Egan (1935), 64 C.C.C. 21 (Man. C.A.) (moving
train); R. v. Macquarie(1875), 13 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) 264 (cast adrift in boat); McDaniel
v. State, 166 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Cr. App. 1942) (moving vehicle); R. v. Lesley (1860),
Bell 220 (on board ship).
See generally: Prosseron Torts (4th ed., 1971) at 42; Fleming on Torts (5th ed., 1977)
at 26; Russell on Crime (supranote 69) at 690; and Perkins and Boyce, CriminalLaw
(3rd ed., 1982) at 225.
82
Supra note 79 at 1309 (S.C.R.), 362 (C.C.C.). For a review of the debate over
negligent false imprisonment in the law of torts, see Harding and Tan Keng Feng,
Negligent False Imprisonment - A Problem in the Law of Trespass(1980), 22 Malaya
L.R. 29.
83
0'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804, 128 C.C.C. 1, at 808 (S.C.R.), 13
(C.C.C.), per Judson J. citing Kenny (17th ed., 1958) at 34: "The difference between
recklessness and negligence is the difference between advertence and inadvertence."
8 There is very little authority in Canada regarding the degree of risk involved in
recklessness. The Law Reform Commission of Canada declined to attempt a definition
in its work CriminalLaw, The GeneralPart:Liability andDefences (1982); See Stuart,
supra note 5, at 134-35; and Gordon, Subjective or Objective Mens Rea (1975), 17
Crim. L.Q. 355, at 380-81. The English trend is to speak in terms of "unreasonable,"
"unacceptable," or "unjustifiable" risk. See Law Commission report on The Mental
Element in Crime.(1978), No. 89; Smith and Hogan, CriminalLaw (4th ed., 1978), at
52; Glanville Williams, Textbook of CriminalLaw(1978), at 72-74.
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that the accused intended or was reckless as to each element of the offence. In
the case of confinement there are at least two separate elements: the act which
is said to cause the confinement, and the consequences, being the restraint of
the victim. In the event that consent should be an issue, 85 there would be a
third element, in this case a circumstance. With respect to the first two
elements, the act and the consequence, and the circumstance of consent should
it be an issue, the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused had the requisite mens rea; that is, that he intended or
was reckless with regard to each element.
This raises the issue of how the Crown is to prove the subjective state of
mind of an accused person. In a rare case it is possible to prove mens reaby examining what the defendant says. In the absence of a confession, the trier of
facts must assess the acts of the accused in the circumstances to determine
whether he acted intentionally or recklessly. On the evidence of objective circumstances, an inference may be drawn that the requisite mens rea was present. Such an inferencd, that a person intends the natural and probable consequence of his acts, is not a presumption but merely a common sense conclusion
based on all of the evidence and bearing in mind that the accused is entitled to
the benefit of any doubt. As was said by Denning L.J. in Hosegood v.
Hosegood:

When people say that a man must be taken to intend the natural consequences of
his acts, they fall into error: there is no 'must' about it: it is only 'may.' The

presumption of intention is not a proposition of law but a proposition of ordinary

good sense. It means this: that, as a man is usually able to foresee what are the

natural consequences of his acts, so it is, as a rule, reasonable to infer that he did
foresee them and intend them. But, while that is an inference which may be drawn,
it is not one which must be drawn. If on
86 all the facts of the case it is not the correct
inference, then it should not be drawn.

The inference is a useful device as a means of justifying how a judge or a jury
can convict an accused person without direct evidence as to his subjective mental state. So long as it is treated as an inference and not a presumption it is
relatively harmless as a way of explaining to a jury that they need not have
such direct evidence. Relatively harmless, that is, until a jury is confronted
with a charge involving both an act and a consequence, and the accused gives
evidence that conflicts with the inference that he intended the consequence. In
the sense that murder involves a consequence apart from the act causing it, the
85 Consent is a defence to false imprisonment at common law: Herd v. Weardale
Steel Co., [1915] A.C. 67 (H.L.); Robinson v. Balmain New Ferry, [1910] A.C. 295

(P.C.).

It may be argued that the defence of consent has not been incorporated into the
CriminalCode. Note that the assault provision expressly provides a defence of consent
[section 244(l)(a)] while there is no similar expression in section 247(2). However, it
could still be contended that section 7(3) has preserved this defence.
There are not many cases dealing with consent as a defence to a criminal prosecution
for false imprisonment. See R. v. Hugo (unreported judgment of the Montreal Court of
Sessions, Morier J., Feb. 10, 1983) where the accused R.C.M.P. officer was acquitted
on charges of forcible confinement and kidnapping because of a good faith, although
mistaken, belief in the consent of the victim. See also People v. Cohoon, 42 N.E. 2d 969
(Ill. App. 1942).
86 (1950), 66 T.L.R. 735, at 738 (C.A.). Approved in R. v. Giannotti,11956] O.R.
349, 23 C.R. 259 (C.A.). See also Popple, Annotation: Presumption that a man intends
the naturalconsequences of his acts (1953), 18 C.R. 43.
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parallel to false imprisonment is useful. 87 In a 1957 murder trial Devlin J. instructed the jury as follows:
The act is proved and you are dealing with intent - whether it was done with the
intention of murder. Intention is something that exists in a man's mind. Apart
from his own evidence it can only be proved from inferences that can be drawn
from his acts, but his own evidence must be welcome. A man, after all, knows his
own mind and if he goes in the witness box and tells you what is in his own mind,
and you think he might be telling the88truth, you would have the best evidence
available on what was in his own mind.

This instruction strikes a fair balance between the need not to undermine the
presumption of innocence and the necessity of informing jurors that they are
free to draw conclusions contrary to the accused, notwithstanding his explanation. As Martin J.A. said in R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher, "[t]he appellants'
evidence as to their state of mind is not, of course, conclusive." 89
The danger of invoking the standard instruction on the inference of intent
in a prosecution for forcible confinement where the accused has an alternate
explanation can be seen in the case of R. v. Farrant.90 Rolan Farrant had been
going with Shannon Russell for four years. He was seventeen and she sixteen.
After breaking off their relationship, they met at a party. Farrant was drinking
beer and smoking marijuana. He spoke to Shannon for about five minutes.
Shannon left the party before 10 with some of her friends. Farrant saw her
leave but continued talking with his friends for a short time when he decided
that he wanted to talk to Shannon. He went home and called her but she said
that she did not want to see him as her friends were there. He said that he was
coming over and mentioned that he was bringing a gun. The accused did not
bring the rifle into the house the first time he entered, leaving it in his truck.
When Shannon refused to talk to him he ordered the others out of the house.
When they refused, he went to the truck and brought in the gun, a loaded .303
with a clip containing ten shells, and commanded the others to leave. When
they tried to take Shannon with them he said: "She stays." The only evidence
of what happened after that point is the testimony of the accused. Shannon
was sitting on the living-room couch, crying and becoming hysterical. The accused tried to talk to her but when he made no progress he took the gun to the
kitchen and left it there, believing that it might be the gun which was upsetting
her. After another minute of trying to talk to her, without success, he walked
back to the kitchen and picked up the gun. He returned to the living-room and
87 Professor Turner was of the view that homicide, assault and false imprisonment
are different from other common law crimes in that they cause difficulties in determin-

ing foresight as to consequences. The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law
(1936),
6 Camb. L.J. 31, at 37.
88
R. v. Adams, [1957] Crim. L.R. 365. Quoted in Carter, Annotation: The Intention to Commit an Offence (1967), 1 C.R.N.S. 299, at 302. This passage was recently

quoted in R. v. Buzzanga andDurocher(1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (Ont. C.A.) at 387

where Martin J.A. commented: "The accused's testimony, if he gives evidence as to

what was in his mind, is important material to be weighed with the other evidence in
determining whether the necessary intent has been established." This case involved a
prosecution for wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group, a statutory offence which seems a likely candidate to add to Turner's exclusive list of common law
crimes.
89

1d,
90(1983), 46 N.R. 337, 32 C.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.), rev'g (1981) 9 Sask. R. 7, and

restoring second degree murder conviction by Maher J. with jury, June 10, 1980,
unreported.
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"just stood there for a minute and the next thing I knew the gun goes off."
Shannon was killed by that shot; the accused called the operator within
moments and told her to call the police, saying that he had just killed his
girlfriend. The accused then fired a second shot, apparently in an attempt to
commit suicide; there was evidence of powder burns beside his ear and of a
slight injury to the inside of the ear.
After a preliminary hearing Farrant was charged with second degree
murder. Throughout the course of the trial the issue was as to the intention of
the accused to cause death or grievous bodily harm as required to establish
murder under section 212(a). After the close of evidence and before the jury
charge the Crown raised the issue of constructive murder during the commission of an offence, the offence being forcible confinement. To prove the confinement the Crown relied primarily on evidence which the accused himself
had given. Crown counsel admitted that she had not intended to rely on section 213(d) until she heard the evidence of the accused. Below is the exchange
on the cross-examination of Farrant which is alleged to have shown his intent
to forcibly confine Shannon:
Q But you wanted to go over and she didn't want to see you?
A I wanted to talk to her and she didn't want to talk to me right then.
Q You decided that you were going to take the rifle and you were going to go over
there and you were going to make her talk to you whether she wanted to stay or
not, isn't that true?
A I wouldn't quite say it that way, no.
Q You wouldn't quite say it that way?
A No I wouldn't.
Q That's essentially true, isn't it?
A It would be essentially, but it's not the way I would think, no.
Q That's not the way - you perhaps don't think the way I put my words
together, but the meaning is the same, isn't it?
A Deep down the hard cold meaning would be the same; but the fact of what's going on in my mind and somebody else's mind is two different things.
Q Right, and you took that rifle over and you were going to get everybody out of
the house and to keep Shannon there to talk to you and be alone with her
because you wanted to be alone with her and talk and she wouldn't talk to you,
right?
A I wouldn't say that was right.
Q
A
Q
A

You've already agreed that you were going to make her talk to you, right?
After that phone call, yes.
You were going to make her talk to you using that rifle?
Well, if it was necessary I guess because I brought it there, that would be true.

The jury was instructed that it should assess the evidence bearing in mind
"the presumption that [a] man intends the natural consequences of his
actions;" and ". . . that one basic inference is that everyone is presumed to intent [sic] the natural consequences of his or her actions." In the Supreme
Court, Dickson J. concluded that there was no error as the jury was told
elsewhere in the instruction that the proposition was an inference which the
jury might draw but that they were free to draw others. That tends to simplify
the issue as being one of inference vs. presumption. It fails to treat the special
problem of intention as to consequences which are separate from the act and it
tends to ignore the value of the testimony of the accused. The effect which the
instruction had upon the jury can be seen in the three questions which they sent
out after retiring to deliberate:
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(i) Is his physical presence without immediate possession of the weapon grounds

for confinement?
(ii) Can confinement again commence when possession of a weapon is regained?
(iii) What is the definition of intent?
It is apparent from these questions that the jury was more concerned with the
presence of the gun than they were with the subjective intention of the accused.
The jurors evidently broke the transaction down into three phases: (i) the initial possession of the weapon; (ii) the period during which the weapon was in
the kitchen; and, (iii) the time when the gun was brought back to the living
room. Everything focused on the weapon. The gun constituted the restraint on
Shannon's liberty and it indicated Farrant's intention to confine her. In
response to the third question, the definition of intent, Maher J. observed that
he had already covered the issue of intent to commit the confinement but went
on to make the following comments:
But intent, whether it be the intent to attempt to confine or to confine, or the

intent to cause death or bodily harm, you usually determine that intent from
an examination of the circumstances. Intent usually is what did a man say,
what did a man do, and then you draw inferences from that bearing in mind
that one basic inference is that everyone is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of his or her actions. If I do a certain thing, whether it be
throwing a book on the floor or pointing a gun at somebody and firing it, it
is natural to assume that I intended the results of what would happen; that
the book would fall on the floor and probably maybe fall apart. If I intended

to shoot at a person with a gun, probably I intended to kill or to do bodily
harm that would cause death.
The jury deliberated for six hours before returning a verdict of guilty of
second degree murder. This case illustrates three points regarding the problem
of forcible confinement and its combined operation with constructive murder:
(i) that an evidentiary aid like the common sense inference that natural consequences of acts are intended can overwhelm the process which it is designed to
facilitate; (ii) that it is essential to consider independently the mental state of
the accused in relation to acts and consequences; and (iii) that, even if Farrant
did intend to clear Shannon's friends out of the house and to keep her there to
talk, the offence thereby committed is completely inappropriate as an underlying element of constructive murder.
This final comment is a reaction to an offence which can occur in circumstances where the accused's ultimate intentions are non-malicious. This
characteristic of forcible confinement has led to some curious analyses of the
relevant guilty mind in prosecutions for forcible confinement, suggesting
perhaps a defence of good faith. Because of the unusual nature of an offence
which proscribes conduct which may not be morally offensive even if intended, it is arguably not enough to simply state a general formulation of mens rea
and apply it mechanically to the physical elements of the crime. If the mental
element is approached in its standard format, then every intentional or reckless
confinement, not expressly excused, would constitute a criminal offence. This
is the view which Canadian commentators, dealing briefly with the provision
in the abstract, have taken. Lagarde says that a director of a mental hospital
who accepts a patient without complying with the legal formalities would be
guilty, as would be a police officer who arrests without justification. He also
cites the curious case of a father who confines his pregnant daughter in the
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barn. 9 1 Mewitt and Manning appear to be in agreement, using the illustration
of a prison warden who confines a person under a defective warrant of committal. 92 Presumably there is no reason why this analysis of subsection 247(2)
could not lead to a charge of first degree murder for both the warden and the
guard firing the shot (perhaps all of the prison employees would be parties to
the offence) if a prisoner, having been confined under a faulty warrant, were
accidentally shot during confinement. Whatever the proper academic analysis
of liability in such circumstances, there is evidence that experienced trial
judges, when faced with a defendant who has committed a confinement for
purposes which are at worst morally indifferent, decline to impose a criminal
sanction.
In R. v. Elder93 the accused was a prisoner in an institution. He was charged with forcibly confining an employee during what the trial judge described as
"an insurrection." The victim was the only employee on duty in the segregation area at the time of the outbreak; the accused put a towel over the victim's
head and led him to another part of the prison. He was subsequently moved
twice, spending most of the time in a dorm where someone brought him a mattress. He was released after a period of a few hours. The accused testified that
it was his intention to protect the victim and take him to "a safe place."
Geatros Dist. Ct. J. accepted this evidence and concluded that he could not
convict the accused of either kidnapping or forcible confinement. He rejected
what he understood to be the Crown's contention, that the latter offence was
one of strict liability, holding that:
There can be no doubt that something more must be proved - "some blameworthy condition of the mind" or "at least an intention to do a94wrong or to break
the law" - than merely that the accused did the prohibited act.

He concluded that the accused's avowed purpose of protecting the confinee
negatived the element of mens rea, and accordingly an acquittal was entered.
Another case which occasioned a comment on the innocent intent of the
accused is R. v. Cunningham and Ritchie,95 where the crew of a cruise vessel
apprehended a youth who had been throwing stones at the ship, and who had
broken one of the windows in the process and doubtless caused some discomfort to the passengers. The boy was captured and brought aboard, after which
he was taken to the wheelhouse and asked to lie on the floor. His ankles were
loosely bound with a piece of rope. The confinement lasted one and a half
hours while the vessel sailed back to Winnipeg, where the boy was turned over
to the police. Although the principal analysis of the judgment of Jewers Co.
Ct. J. was on the issue of justification, he concluded that even if the accused
had exceeded their authority by using excessive force, they would not be
criminally liable since they had proceeded in good faith with a legitimate purpose. He commented:
91
92

Supra note 65, at 676.
CriminalLaw(1978), at 480.

93 (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 122, [1978] 3 W.W.R. 351"(Sask. Dist. Ct.).
94Id. at 128.

95 (1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 390 (Man. Co. Ct.).
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The accused, of course, cannot be found criminally liable unless it can be established not only that they committed
the act with which they are charged but that they
96
did so with guilty intent.

If one had to choose between justification and absence of mens rea as the ratio
of this decision then logically it should be the latter, since the issue of justification would only be relevant once the requisite elements of the offence had been
established.
In neither Cunningham and Ritchie nor Elderis it clear what is meant by

the element of "guilty intent." One possible analysis is that a requirement of
"wrongful purpose," or at least a defence of good faith, is being read into the
provision. If that is so, it would appear to conflict with the traditional view in
criminal law that motive is irrelevant to a determination of criminal liability.
An illustration often put forward in support of this view is that a man who
breaks into a house to steal money to buy Christmas presents for his children is
just as guilty as a man who steals to finance a heroin habit. 97 In Lewis v. The
Queen the observation that motive was legally irrelevant was prefaced with the
comment that the Court had accepted "the term 'motive' in a criminal law
sense as meaning 'ulterior intention'." 98 In this way motive is defined as irrelevant intention. As is admitted by Glanville Williams, whose definition was accepted as a starting point in Lewis:
If the foregoing definition of motive is accepted, it becomes tautologous to say
that motive is irrelevant to legal responsibility. For as soon as the99word "motive"
is uttered, it is impliedly asserted to be irrelevant to responsibility.

As Williams has made clear elsewhere'00 the distinction between motive and intent is not a scientific one. Instead it is only a convenience for lawyers who,
having determined what intent is relevant, employ such terminological apparatus to exclude the rest. Says Williams:
Although the verbal distinction between "intention" and "motive" is convenient,
it must be realised that the remoter intention called motive is still an intention. 101
The reference to the exclusion of motive is ultimately a circular analysis, bringing one back to the issue of what intention is relevant in order to establish the
"blameworthy condition of mind" or "guilty intent" sought by Geatros Dist.
Ct. J. and Jewers Co. Ct. J. in their analyses. Because of the morally indifferent nature of an act like confinement, which could be committed playfully
or even, as in the Elder case, to help the victim, one intuitively wants to treat it
differently from offences which are malum in se.
Some American courts, faced with factual circumstances in which they
have evidently felt some sympathy for the defendant, have introduced what
might be considered as a "good motive" exception. In a 1933 case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced with an appeal from a conviction for false
imprisonment after a district attorney, a detective and a constable were pros96

Id. at 399.
Fletcher, Rethinking CriminalLaw,supra note 29, at 452.
98 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 821 at 832,47 C.C.C. (2d) 24 at 34.
99 Glanville Williams, CriminalLaw The GeneralPart(2d ed., 1961), at 49.

97

100 The MentalElement in Crime (1965).
1011d. at 14.
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ecuted for unlawfully confining a suspect in an arson investigation. There was
no evidence of the parties being motivated by anything but a sense of duty.
The trial judge had told the jury that "[m]otive is not a factor in the correct
determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendants." 102 The Supreme
Court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial, with the observation
that:
The motives, good faith, and purpose of the defendants are legitimate matters of
defense to be considered by the jury in passing 0up on the false imprisonment indictments, as they negative the idea of criminality. I
The same point has since been adopted by a Georgia appeals court, again in a
case involving a police officer, 104 and more recently by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, this time in a much less plausible set of circumstances. In State v.
Hembd, 105 the complainant was walking home from a tavern when, according
to her, she was approached from behind by the defendant, who grabbed her
coat and told her he wanted to talk to her over a cup of coffee. Her screams
were overheard by local residents, who testified that they saw the defendant
force her into his car. The defendant's story was that he observed the woman
walking on the street crying. She told him that she had attempted to commit
suicide six times in the past and that she was about to do it again, whereupon
he undertook to force her into the car to take her to the police station. The
Supreme Court held that it was an error for the trial court not to instruct the
jury that good motive is a defence to a charge of false imprisonment, stating
the matter as follows:
There can be no doubt that a bona fide attempt to prevent a suicide is not a crime
in any jurisdiction, even where it involves the detention, against her will, of the
person planning to kill herself. Had defendant seized complainant as she was
about to leap from a building, and had he kept her locked in a safe place until the
authorities arrived, it is106
clear that a conviction for the crime of false imprisonment
could not be sustained.
What these cases illustrate is, on the one hand, the resistance of the
criminal law process to prohibiting confinements that are not morally offensive per se, at least in terms of the intentions of the accused, and, on the other
hand, the difficult choices which are imposed upon triers of fact when they are
asked to decide which confinements can, although intended, be excused by the
good motives of the accused. A "good faith" defence involves difficult value
choices which introduce into criminal law an element of uncertainty, so that a
person could be convicted or acquitted not on a jury finding as to his subjective state of mind but on an objective determination of the "goodness" of his
motive. The task of triers of fact is greatly complicated when they are asked to
decide whether one can approach a would-be suicide on the street and force
her into an automobile, ostensibly for her own preservation. The Criminal
Code presently provides defences for parents and school teachers to use
102 Commonwealth v. Trunk, 167 A. 333 (1933).
10 3 Id. at 338. See Aston, Motive as an EssentialElement to the Crime of FalseIm-

prisonment(1934), 38 Dick. L. Rev. 184.
104Hendersonv. State, 99 S.E.2d 270 (1957).
105 232 N.W.2d 872 (1975).
1061d. at 878.
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reasonable discipline, 0 7 for surgeons to perform operations without
consent, 108 for masters of ships to impose reasonable discipline, 1°9 and for
police officers and private citizens to make arrests under prescribed circumstances. 110 While it is not beyond the scope of the common law to introduce new defences to crimes,111 a general notion of "good motive" seems
excessive as a reaction to an anomalous prohibition which, by without more
proscribing every intentional confinement, invites the invention of such
defences. This development manifests not the need for a general defence of
good motive in criminal law but instead the tenuous status of false imprisonment as a criminal prohibition. It would be far better to abolish the provision
entirely or to prescribe particular wrongful purposes than to proceed with a
loose search for a "blameworthy state of mind." 112
To sum up the discussion of the requisite elements of forcible confinement, the prosecution must prove that the accused either intentionally or
recklessly committed acts which were sufficient to totally restrain the victim
and that he intended, or was reckless with regard to, the consequent confinement. It is particularly important that triers of fact be alert not to casually
draw inferences against the accused without fully weighing an alternative explanation of his mental state, especially with respect to circumstances (consent) or consequences (confinement).
IV. RESTRICTING THE EXPLOSIVE COMBINATION
Parliament's treatment of both the forcible confinement and the constructive murder provisions has been appallingly careless. The major amendment to the forcible confinement provision was accomplished not by Parliament
but by the revisers of the statutes in 1906. The undeliberated amendments to
the constructive murder provision were enacted in such an unexplained and
sometimes inexplicable fashion that they too may have been clerical errors.
The combined effect of the two is, without more, repugnant as a departure
from general principles of criminal responsibility. But when the two are taken
together with the classification provision categorizing this type of murder as
first degree, and the punishment provisions providing a mandatory life
sentence without parole eligibility for twenty-five years, the result is still more
Draconian. Beyond the objectionable prospect of such a harsh sanction for the
107R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 43.
08
Id., s. 45.
I09 Id., s. 44.

" 01d., ss. 449 and 450. There is a good faith defence, limited to specific purposes,
in the sedition provisions. See, s. 61.
"' See R. v. Amato (1982), 42 N.R. 487 (S.C.C.), at 520-24 (perEstey J.).
2
The two Canadian cases, Elder, supra note 93, and Cunningham and Ritchie,
supra note 95, can both be justified on other grounds. In Cunningham and Ritchie,
Jewers Co. Ct. J., furnished the alternative analysis of justification to arrest under

s. 449(2)(b) of the Criminal Code. In Elder a preferable analysis would be that the
motive of assisting the victim to safety was evidence that the accused had no intent to
confine him but merely to help, with the victim being free to depart at will. That is not
the same thing as saying that an intent to confine for the purpose of assisting the victim
falls short of some requisite "blameworthy state of mind." The analysis of motive as
relevant evidence of, but not essential to, the mens rea is set out by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Lewis v. The Queen, supra note 98.
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individual accused, there is also inherent in such a scheme a potential for
abusive prosecutions since there is vested in prosecutors a discretion to convert
what would otherwise be manslaughter, second degree murder, or even nonculpable homicide into first degree murder by relying upon a fortuitous or incidental element of confinement.
This problem arises in three different circumstances:
A. where confinement is an incidental element of another underlying offence in
s. 213 which is classified as second degree murder, the prime example being
robbery;
B. where confinement is an incidental element of an assault causing death, which
situation would otherwise be prosecuted only as intent murder; and,
C. where confinement is intended but in circumstances bearing considerably less
moral opprobrium than a hostage-taking.
It will be submitted that in each of these cases courts have a duty to enforce the
policy of the homicide provisions, to prevent prosecutorial abuse, and to
adhere to some rational basis of criminal responsibility for murder. There is
nothing incompatible among these three objectives but, unfortunately, Canadian courts in a purported exercise of deference to Parliament have for the
most part declined to do any more than to mechanically apply the provisions
and drop the accused through a trap-door. In so doing, what the courts have
done in effect is to defer not to-Parliament but to prosecutors. Typical of this
extreme positivism is the majority judgment of the Supreme Court in R. v.
Farrant,where Dickson J. declined to consider what policy might underlie this
combination of provisions:
The rule may seem harsh but it is not the function of this Court to consider the
policy of legislation validly enacted. So long as the section continues
in our
113
CriminalCode it must be given effect in accordance with its terms.
Given the seriousness of the consequences for the accused, and especially
against a backdrop of Parliamentary carelessness in drafting the legislation,
such a slavish and mechanical conception of the role of courts in the criminal
justice process is disheartening. Moreover, it misses the mark in its purported
respect for the will of the legislature. In each of the three circumstances set out
above the courts can achieve, not defeat, the policy of the Criminal Code by
playing a more thoughtful role and declining to respond in knee-jerk fashion
to prosecutorial claims.
A.

ConfinementIncidentalto Another Underlying Offence
Opportunities to enforce the scheme of the homicide provisions where
confinement is incidental to robbery have recently been declined by the British
Columbia and Ontario Courts of Appeal, with leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada being refused in the latter instance. In R. v. Gourgon and
Knowles,11 4 the two accused were charged with first degree murder. They
drove to the home of a former co-worker about 5 A.M.; broke into the
residence and wakened the occupants, who were the deceased, his wife and his
mother-in-law. The three were taken to the living-room at knife-point where
the keys to a hotel and the combination to the hotel safe were taken from the
3

Supra note 90, at 340 (N.R.), 291 (C.R.).
14 (1979), 9 C.R. (3d) 313 (B.C.S.C.).
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victim. He and his wife were then taken to the bedroom where they were
bound at both the wrists and the ankles. The mother-in-law was tied up in the
living-room. Without warning the accused attacked her. The victim and his
wife freed themselves and came running from the bedroom. The victim was
stabbed and killed in the ensuing struggle. Anderson J. (as he then was) declined to put first degree murder to the jury on any basis other than planning and
deliberation, responding to the argument that there could be a conviction of
first degree based on forcible confinement by saying, "It [Parliament] did not
intend that whenever the fact of forcible confinement existed, no matter how
incidental or temporary, and death ensued, there should be a conviction for
first degree murder." 5 The jury acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of second degree. On appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal
the ruling of Anderson J. was reversed, although no new trial was ordered for
discretionary reasons. McFarlane J.A. disapproved of the reasoning of the
trial judge, saying:
Nothing is expressed or implied in those sections about the purpose of the confinement. Neither is there anything in the history of the legislation to suggest a limitation of that nature to be placed upon the word "confinement". The interpretation

that confinement for the one purpose of robbery is excluded cannot be supported.

I think the jury should have been instructed that, if they decided that Gourgon did

murder the victim, that murder was first degree if the jury also found that the victim's death was caused by Gourgon while he was confining 116
or attempting to confine any one or more of the three occupants of the residence.

The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently adopted these views in Dollan
andNewstead.n 7 There seems little doubt, and indeed it was the theory of the
Crown, that the purpose of the accused in coming to the residence was to obtain a vehicle. The two accused stayed at the Kehoe home only long enough to
steal a truck, a .303 rifle, some ammunition and a wallet. In the course of the
transaction, Dollan fired a fatal shot through the bedroom door and bound
the occupants of the household. Defence counsel argued that the prosecution
could not rely upon the incidental element of confinement to support a charge
of first degree murder, but Dupont J. rejected the point and in this he was
upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal, where Zuber J.A. gave reasons,
quoting from the British Columbia decision to conclude:
With respect, I agree with these words of McFarlane J.A. It is of no consequence

that the unlawful confinement may be incidental to the commission of some other
crime as long as there has been an unlawful confinement contrary to s. 247 of the
Criminal Code. The jury was
correctly instructed on this issue and on this point the
118
appellant Dollan must fail.

11

11d. at 324-25. As a concluding note to his judgment, Anderson J. made the

following plea for legislative action (at 331):
In conclusion, I wish to draw the attention of the Crown to the serious inadequacies to be found in s. 214(5) of the Code. Criminal laws should, as far as possi-

ble, be clearly and simply stated so that those laws may be enforced in a uniform

manner and with certainty and consistency. I would ask, therefore, that my
remarks and these reasons be made known to the Minister of Justice so that he may
consider such amendments to s. 214(5) as may be required.
116 (1979), 19 C.R. (3d) 272, at 279.
,7Supra note 9.
118 Id. at 245.
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The objection to these two decisions is that they decline to apply the
classification mechanism of the Criminal Code and, in doing so, undermine
one of the few deliberate policy choices which Parliament has made regarding
the law of homicide. In 1961, Parliament for the first time introduced a
distinction between murder which was punishable by death and that which was
punishable by life imprisonment. 119 The scheme classified as capital murder
that which was planned and deliberate, that which caused the death of a
policeman or a prison employee, and constructive murder committed during
any of the underlying offences.120 A 1967 amendment made murder capital only
when the death of a policeman or a prison employee resulted, thereby treating
all constructive murder as non-capital. 121 This essential scheme continued' 22
until 1976, when the first degree/second degree classification was introduced
and capital punishment was abolished.1 23 The punishment for both first and
second degree murder is life imprisonment, the crucial distinction being a
parole ineligibility period of twenty-five years for the former and ten years for
the latter. Classified as first degree are murders resulting in the death of a
policeman or prison employee, murder which is planned and deliberate, and
murder caused during the commission of selected offences from the constructive murder provision. For the first time, then, Parliament distinguished
among the underlying offences of the constructive murder provision. It is
unlikely that this was a mere casual triage, being a classification resulting from
an agonizing fifteen-year debate over the abolition of capital punishment. In
this context it is a fair assumption that the distinction is not inadvertent.
The resulting scheme classifies murder committed during sexual assaults,
hijacking, kidnapping and forcible confinement as first degree, with all other
types of murder being second degree. Into this residual category would fall
murder committed during the course of robbery, piracy, arson, sabotage,
breaking and entering, treason and escape from custody. If it is true that
Parliament perceives the constructive murder provision as an ex ante determination of circumstances in which the accused ought to contemplate the
likelihood of a resulting death, the 1976 differentiation among the underlying
offences makes sense because those crimes which are classified as first degree
involve by definition personal violence against a target victim. At least that is
true of sexual assaults, kidnapping and forcible confinement in its classic form
as a hostage-taking. Hijacking is less categorically an offence of personal
violence but it may have been included because of the close association between it and kidnapping in the 1975 amendments. It is also more like the first
degree group in terms of the likelihood of personal violence which might be
reasonably contemplated than it is like the residual offences which are essen119 S.C. 1960-61, c. 44, s. 2 (becoming s. 206 of CriminalCode).

120 S.C. 1960-61, c. 44, s. 1 (becoming s. 202A of CriminalCode).
121S.C. 1967-68, c. 15, s. 1 (replacing the former s. 202A of Code).
122 There

was an amendment in 1973 but it did not affect the existing classification.

Murders of policemen and prison employees continued to be punishable by death, and
other murders by life imprisonment with a minimum of ten years required to be served

before being eligible for parole. S.C. 1973-74, c. 38, ss. 2 and 3.
123 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 105, s. 4. There has been a further amendment to s. 214 to
accord with the amendments to sexual offence legislation: S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 125, s.

16.
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tially crimes against property, which have potential for personal violence but
which do not by definition require such violence.
It is unconvincing, therefore, to simply respond as did McFarlane J.A. in
Gourgon and Knowles that "nothing is expressed or implied in those
sections" 124 to justify a different treatment where the confinement is incidental
to an offence which would otherwise be classified as second degree. To decline
to characterize a murder as being committed either during robbery or during
forcible confinement is to ignore the obvious policy of Parliament in devising a
scheme whereby certain murders, including those committed in the course of a
forcible confinement, are first degree while others are second degree. Surely it
cannot be said that nothing is implied by a provision, enacted in the context of
a protracted debate over the abolition of capital punishment, when the
designation of the section is "Classification of Murder" (emphasis added).
The language of the section is that of a virtual command:
214. (1) Murder is first degree murder or second degree murder.

(5) Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and deliberate on the part of
any person, murder is first degree murder in respect of a person when the death is
caused by that person

(a) while committing or attempting to commit an offence under section 76.1
(hijacking aircraft) or 247 (kidnapping and forcible confinement);
i7)"
All murder that is not first degree murder is second degree murder. (Em-

phases added.)

Can it be said that Parliament imposed a regime of classification of
murder yet intended that the most incidental element of restraint would suffice
to characterize a killing as being one occurring in the course of forcible confinement? To so argue is to undermine the entire classification function.
Gourgon and Dollan were committing robberies. Parliament classifies murder
committed in the course of robbery as second degree. Yet due to an incidental
element of confinement, the murder is transformed into first degree. Practically
all robbery involves a confinement, which also has the potential of being an incidental or even a constituent element of other offences in section 213. Hence,
notwithstanding the classification of murders committed in the course of robbery, piracy, sabotage, arson, etc., as second degree, the Crown can obtain a
first degree conviction by relying upon an element of confinement, although
such confinement may be only fortuitous or incidental. Two of these offences,
robbery and piracy, would appear by their very nature to import an aspect of
confinement. To avoid a virtual countermanding of the classification scheme
by enthusiastic Crown counsel, it seems imperative that courts should not accept first degree charges where the only basis for first degree murder is confinement as an incidental aspect of another offence.
Classification is not a new function for Canadian courts; they need only
draw on their experience under the division of powers in constitutional law.
When murder committed during the commission of a robbery carries a consequence less than half as severe as the consequence for murder committed during a forcible confinement, it is unconvincing to deny that the courts have a
duty to characterize the murder so as to eliminate incidental aspects. To hold
that it matters not whether an element is incidental or essential is an unlikely
way to perform a classification function. For courts to decline to classify
Supranote 121.

124
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murders as being committed either in the course of robbery or in the course of
forcible confinement is to abdicate responsibility for ensuring that the will of
Parliament is enforced and to concede to the Crown a broad discretion to
prosecute as first degree murder cases where the accused may never have contemplated a confinement and where he may realistically have estimated the
risks of personal violence to be relatively low, relative that is to what he ought
to have foreseen as the risks had he contemplated a hostage-taking. Therefore
it can be seen that some sense can be imposed on the disarray of the homicide
provisions by requiring courts to do what is their obvious function under the
25
classification provision: to classify. 1
There is in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Farrant 126 a parallel abdication of the classification function. In that case the
Crown had charged second degree murder but, after the close of evidence,
because of certain responses given by the accused on cross-examination, the
prosecutrix requested the trial judge to instruct the jury on constructive
murder committed during forcible confinement. The jury was so instructed
and the accused was convicted. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal' 27 quashed
the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that the Crown could not rely
on forcible confinement after charging second degree murder. The Supreme
Court of Canada allowed an appeal by the Crown. The majority of the Court,
in an opinion by Dickson J., held that the classification provision is "subservient" to the definition sections:
Section 214, however, is not the section which sets out the elements of the offence
of murder. This is done in ss. 212 and 213. Section 214 does not create a distinct
and independent substantive offence of first degree constructive murder pursuant
to forcible confinement. The section is subservient to ss. 212 and 213; it classifies
for sentencing purposes, the offences in s. 212 and s. 213 as either first or second
degree murder.... The primary and essential determination for a jury to make is
whether murder has been committed, either under s. 212 or, where the evidence
warrants it, under s. 213. Considerations of the distinctions between first and second degree murder are irrelevant in making this128preliminary determination. Once
the offence has been found, it is then classified.
This holding demonstrates a fundamental misperception of the homicide provisions of the CriminalCode. There is no offence of murder created in section
212 or section 213 of the Code. One could no more be convicted of murder
' An illustration of the scope of discretion given the prosecutor by failing to
restrict first degree charges to true confinements and of the anomalous results produced
thereby can be seen in the case of R. v. McKinnon (conviction of first degree murder
before Dechene J. and jury, Alta. S.C., Oct. 29, 1977, unreported). McKinnon and his
accomplice Meyer broke into a church sacristy for the purpose of committing a robbery.
Meyer tied up the caretaker with materials found on the premises. In the course of the
robbery, Meyer called McKinnon by name within hearing distance of the caretaker, so
McKinnon decided to shoot the victim. Both Meyer and McKinnon were charged with
first degree murder, but Meyer pleaded guilty to second degree and testified for the
Crown. The jury was instructed on planning and deliberation as well as forcible confinement as theories to support the first degree charge against McKinnon. The accused
argued that the confinement was not part of the common enterprise and that Meyer had
acted on his own. An appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal was dismissed (September
14, 1979, unreported), and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied
(1980), 35 N.R. 178.
'26 Supra note 90.
127 Id.
In Id. at 351-52 (N.R.), 301-302 (C.R.).
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contrary to these sections than one could be convicted of homicide contrary to
section 205 or of infanticide contrary to section 216. Section 212 and 213 are
definition provisions, not offences. The homicide scheme of the Criminal
Code does not provide for an offence of "murder," only first degree murder
or second degree murder. The offence of second degree murder is proscribed
by section 218 and the classification provision is just as vital as are the definition sections in reaching a determination of guilt or innocence. 129 Section 214
classifies murder committed in the course of forcible confinement as first
degree; there is no such offence as second degree murder where the Crown
relies on the constructive murder provision and forcible confinement is the
underlying offence.130 Neither does there exist an offence of second degree
murder where a policeman or a prison guard is the victim. If the majority in
Farrantis correct then the Crown has a discretion to charge second degree
when a policeman is murdered as that classification is phrased in identical
terms to the classification of forcible confinement/constructive murder. When
the matter is looked at in this light it becomes evident that the courts have truly
reneged on their duty to enforce the classification scheme. The problem is not
a complicated one. It simply involves starting with the offence-creating section
218 and working through both the definition sections and the classification
section to determine if the offence charge has been proved. In this way the
courts would do only what Dickson J. claimed they were doing in Farrant: give
effect to the Criminal Code "in accordance with its terms." 131 They would
also take a step toward controlling prosecutorial abuse. The contrast between
the virtual prosecutorial ignorance of forcible confinement prior to 1975132
129The indictment against Farrant charged that he "did commit second degree
murder on the person of Shannon Russell, contrary to Section 218(1) of the Criminal
Code" [emphasis added].
130
InFarrant,Dickson J. points out that the language of the French version of
s. 214(5) is "much less" imperative than the English version which says: "Murder is
first degree" when constructive murder based on forcible confinement is alleged. The
French version of subsection (5) reads: "Est assimile au meurtre au premier degr." It is
true that the French version is less categorical than the English, as the French approximately translated means "is likened to" or is "identified with." However, when the
French version of subsection (5) is read in the context of the whole provision it can hardly
be argued that the situations specified in the subsection could lead to second degree
charges. Subsections (1) and (7) are set out as follows:
214. (1) 1l existe deux categories de meurtres: ceux du premier degr6 et ceux de
deuxi~me degr6.
(7) Les meurtres qui n'appartiennent pas A la catdgorie des meurtres au
premier degr6 sont des meurtres au deuxi~me degr6.
It is difficult to imagine that Parliament would set up a scheme entitled "Classification"
with two categories A and B; then enumerate specific instances, including X, which are
"likened to" A; then direct that situations not "belonging to" A are B; and still leave
open the possibility that X belongs to category B.
Mr. Justice Dickson did not pursue the point, possibly because he realized that to
prefer the French version over the English would put the Court in the ironic position of
adopting the interpretation which, in the particular circumstances of the case, would be
.less favourable to the accused. Compare the position taken in Howley v. Deputy
Attorney-General of Canada, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 45, (1976), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 106, at 53
(S.C.R.), 112-13 (C.C.C.); R. v. Woods and Gruener (1980), 19 C.R. (3d) 136, 57
C.C.C. (2d) 220, at 158 (C.R.), 237 (C.C.C.) (Ont. C.A.); and Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (1974), at 153.
131
Supra note 113.
132
Supra text at note 7.

1983]

ForcibleConfinement andConstructiveMurder

and its invocation as a foundation for a charge of murder, normally first
degree, at least four times in the past several years is itself evidence of the disingenuous use to which it has been put.
B.

Confinement Incidentalto Assault CausingDeath
Even if courts will enforce the classification scheme, thereby preventing
the conversion of robbery/second degree murder into confinement/first
degree murder, there remain two major problems arising from this unhappy,
explosive combination. The first of these is the potential for prosecutors to rely
on confinement in what would otherwise be an assault/homicide. Take as an
example a domestic quarrel in the "confines" of the family kitchen or an
assault in a dead-end alley. If the victim dies and the prosecution is having difficulty proving intention or recklessness, the process could be short-circuited
by alleging that the death occurred during a confinement, ergo first degree
murder. If we assume that the victim was not being held in any fashion other
than what could be said to be incidental to the assault, the question is whether
there are any devices which a court might employ to prevent the conversion of
a typical homicide into first degree murder, which conversion would be accomplished without an inquiry into either planning and deliberation or intent.
If the example of the courts in applying section 213 has not been encouraging,
the judicial treatment of section 212(c) 133 may provide some inspiration. The
Ontario Court of Appeal has recognized the need to "prevent section 212(c)
from overflowing its banks and making murder of almost every unlawful
homicide." 134 Accordingly, a requirement has been grafted on to the provision
that there be an unlawful object distinct from the immediate object of the act
causing death. 135 Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a judgment
recognizing the evolution of the criminal law and "even more so the attitudes
of all of those administering it," 136 has introduced the additional stipulation
that the unlawful object be an indictable offence requiring mens rea. What
these two glosses on section 212(c) manifest is a judicial resistance to deviate
from the norm of intentional or reckless homicide as murder. Moreover, the
requirement of a separate object responds to a concern that the imposition of
objective liability not be premised upon a factor which is included in the act
causing death.
The courts in California have had to deal with similar issues in the context
of felony-murder, which continues to survive in that state through the com133 212. Culpable homicide is murder: (c) where a person, for an unlawful object,
does anything that he knows or ought to know is likely to cause death, and thereby
causes death to a human being, notwithstanding that he desires to effect his object
without causing death or bodily harm to any human being.
134 R. v. DeWolfe (1976), 13 O.R. (2d) 302 at 308, 31 C.C.C. (2d) 23 at 29 per
Zuber J.A. There is some indication in the judgment of Zuber J.A. that the Court
would have been willing to further confine the section in line with R. v. Blackmore
(1967), 1 C.R.N.S. 286, 53 M.P.R. 141 (N.S.C.A.) and Downey v. The Queen, [1971]
N.F.L.R. 97, but felt constrained by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Gravesv. The King (1913), 47 S.C.R. 568,21 C.C.C. 44.
135 R. v. DeWolfe, id.; R. v. Tennant and Naccarato (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 687, 23
C.C.C. (2d) 80 (C.A.); Stuart, supra note 5, at 208-14.
136R. v. Vasil, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 469, 35 N.R. 451, at 499 (S.C.R.), 481 (N.R.), per
Lamer J. Note also the doubt which the judgment in Vasil casts upon the authority of
Graves, id.
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mon law 137 as second degree murder, with the added judicial requirement that
the felony be inherently dangerous. In People v. Ireland, the accused was
found guilty of second degree murder of his wife, the killing having occurred
during what the prosecution claimed to be the crime of assault with a deadly
weapon. The Supreme Court rejected the position that the underlying felony
could be an integral part of the homicide itself, calling such tactics "bootstrapping":
To allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury
from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide
has been committed as a result of a felonious assault - a category which includes
the great majority of all homicides. This kind of bootstrapping finds support
neither in logic nor in law. We therefore hold that a second degree felony-murder
instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an
integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the
38 prosecution
shows to be an offence included infact within the offence charged.1
A similar approach is of long-standing in New York. 139 Thus it is likely that a
successful argument could be made, based on Canadian experience with section 212(c) and the principles developed in the New York and California
courts, to prevent the circumvention of the principal murder provisions
through reliance upon a confinement which is in reality part of the homicide
itself.
C. Confinement Not Intended asHostage-Taking
The final problem, perhaps more remote in that one would rarely expect a
prosecutor to be so ruthless as to resort to the forcible confinement provision
in such circumstances, occurs when the accused in fact does intend to restrain
the victim, the confinement is separate from the homicidal act, no other offence is present to permit characterization of the confinement as secondary or
incidental, but the accused does not commit the confinement in such a way as
to come within the implicit risk-taking criterion of the constructive murder
provision. One such case might be Mewitt and Manning's example of the
prison warden who confines a prisoner under a defective warrant of committal. 140 Apart from a "good faith" 141 defence to the underlying confinement,
137 But see People v. Ramos, supranote 37.
138450 P.2d 580, at 590 (1969). See also People v. Sears 465 P.2d. 847 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. 1970). The Ireland rule was developed under the common law second degree
murder. Sears, on the other hand, involved application of a statutory first degree
murder which is predicated upon six enumerated underlying offences, one of which is
burglary. The felonious intent requisite for burglary in the Searscase was alleged to consist of the intent, at the time of entry, to commit an assault. The Court rejected the
reliance upon the assault, itself an integral part of the homicidal act, as also constituting
a critical element of the underlying felony.
139 As long ago as 1906 the New York courts were applying the same principle, that
the felony be separate from the homicidal act; for example, People v. Huter, 184 N.Y.
237 at 244 (Ct. App. 1906):
In order, therefore, to constitute murder in the first degree by the unintentional
killing of another while engaged in the commission of a felony, we think that while
the violence may constitute a part of the homicide, yet the other elements constituting the felony in which he is engaged must be so distinct from that of the
homicide as not to be an ingredient of the homicide, indictable therewith or convictable thereunder.
140 Supra note 92.
141Supra, text at notes 91-112. Consider also an application of subsection 25(2) of
the CriminalCode.
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there would be no reason on an application of the Criminal Code why an accidental discharge of a guard's firearm would not amount to first degree
murder. A second such instance, and a troubling one, is the case of R. v. Farrant.142 Supposing Farrant did intend to bring the gun into the house to make
Shannon's friends leave and to keep them from taking her out, and that he did
want to make her stay to talk with him, an accidental discharge of the gun in
such circumstances ought not to come within the policy of the constructive
murder provision. If there is any rationale for constructive murder it is that the
degree of contemplation of violence resulting in death is so great in certain
prescribed circumstances that Parliament can determine a priorithe accused's
mental state. One can imagine a forcible confinement in the style of a hostagetaking, where a victim is forcibly imprisoned or held for ransom or other gain,
being accepted as equivalent to a kidnapping or hijacking, which offences happen to be the counterparts of forcible confinement in the classification of
murder. That a difference in degree exists among confinements was observed
by the Commentators to the American Model Penal Code:
First, the entire range of misconduct based on unlawful confinement of another
must not be lumped together in one undifferentiated offence for purposes of
grading. The person who physically restrains another on a public street in order to
drive a point home is guilty of wrongful interference with the other's personal
liberty, but a rational penal code must distinguish such conduct from prolonged
confinement and isolation from the protection of the law. Even such instances of
more serious misbehavior, such as locking another in a closet for several hours,
should be treated differently from abduction for ransom. 143
To treat as murder a killing which occurs accidentally or negligently during a
confinement initiated to drive home a point on a public street and to equate it
with killing during the course of a prolonged imprisonment for ransom would
be to deny the existence of any policy underlying constructive murder. To fail
to distinguish would be to apply the letter of the law to defeat its spirit.
Especially when the gravity of the consequence is considered, there is a very
persuasive argument that courts ought not to treat every unlawful confinement
as a suitable basis for constructive murder.144
The suggestion that Courts ought to differentiate between major and
minor confinements for purposes of applying the constructive murder doctrine
may at first seem to propose a new and radical role for courts. But there is a
precedent, and it is particularly apt. Courts in the United States, faced with
some especially harsh implications of kidnapping laws, have undertaken to
mitigate these effects by restricting the application of the law to more serious
incidents. Kidnapping was at common law only a misdemeanour, and it was
not among the most serious offences when first enacted in legislation.
142 Supra note

90.

143 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (1980), Art.

212.1, at 220.
144 Another case in which the confinement is likely to have been incidental to other
purposes of the accused, but where it was invoked to support, at least in the alternative,
a conviction of first degree murder, is R. v. Klyne (1983), 22 Sask. R. 185 (C.A.). In that
case, the accused drove the victim sixteen miles to a grain shelter and stabbed him twice.
The main issue on appeal involved the defence of provocation to the intent/first degree
theory. The jury had been instructed on a forcible confinement/first degree theory as
well and, in a throwaway reference in the final paragraph of the judgment, Hall J.A.
observed that there was evidence in the testimony of the accused which was capable of
supporting a finding of forcible confinement.
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However, the dramatic increase in the frequency of kidnappings in the late
1920s and early 1930s, culminating in the Lindbergh tragedy, prompted a wave
of sweeping statutory changes in both federal and state jurisdictions.145 The
federal legislation defined kidnapping as occurring when a victim was
(i) "unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or
carried away by any means whatsoever" and (ii) "held for ransom or reward
or otherwise." Punishment was either death or long prison terms. In Chatwin
v. United States, the Supreme Court noted the "comprehensive language" of
the statue and commented:
Were we to sanction a careless concept of the crime of kidnapping or were we to
disregard the background and setting of the Act the boundaries of potential liability would be lost in infinity. A loose construction of the statutory language conceivably could lead to the punishment of anyone who induced another to leave his
surroundings and do some innocent or illegal act of benefit to the former, state
lines subsequently being traversed. The absurdity of such a result, with its attendant likelihood of unfair punishment and blackmail, is sufficient by itself to
foreclose that construction. 146
The New York statute was also drafted in broad terms, one version of
which constituted the offence as: "confines" another with intent to "cause
him... to be confined." In Peoplev. Levy, 147 the New York Court of Appeals
was faced with an appeal from a kidnapping conviction where two armed men
entered the victims' automobile, drove twenty seven city blocks in a time
period of twenty minutes, robbed the victims of jewelry and cash, and then
departed. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this would amount to kidnapping in the strict terms of the statute but went on to note the manner in
which such a definition could overrun lesser crimes, "notably robbery and
rape, and in some circumstances assault," and concluded:
We now overrule [an earlier decision] to limit the application of kidnapping statute
to "kidnapping" in the148
conventional sense in which that term has now come to
have acquired meaning.
The California Supreme Court 149 has followed the New York and the
Michigan Courts of Appeal, faced with a statute defining kidnapping, in the
words of the Court, as to "intentionally confine another person without legal
justification or excuse," gave the statute a restricted interpretation to avoid
finding it constitutionally void for vagueness. The Court found a literal
reading of the legislation to be so open-ended as to confer unlimited discretion
upon judges, jurors and, especially, prosecutors:
Discretion thus unbound by fixed standards becomes not discretion in the legal
sense of the term, but, rather, naked and arbitrary power .... A literal reading of
145 Fisher and McGuire, Kidnapping and the So-Called Lindbergh Law (1935), 12
N.Y.U.L.Q. 646; Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping (1953), 53 Colum. L.
Rev. 540.
146326 U.S. 455, at 464-65 (1946). See United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60 (2d
Cir. 1982).
147 15 N.Y.2d 159 (1965).
148 Id. at 164-65. See Peoplev. Miles, 297 N.Y.S. 2d 913 (1969); People v. Lombardi,

282 N.Y.S. 2d 519 (1967); People v. Cassidy, 390 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1976); Parker, Aspects
ofMerger in the Law ofKidnapping(1970), 55 Cornell L. Rev. 527.
149People v. Daniels, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969), at 906; People v. Smith, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 743 (1971)..
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the kidnapping statute would permit a prosecutor to aggravate the charges against
any assailant, robber, or rapist by charging the literal violation of
150 the kidnapping
statute which must inevitably accompany each of those offenses.
Concluding that criminal statutes cannot be expanded to meet situations
beyond the contemplation of the legislature at the time of enactment, even
though the particular circumstances might come within the broad wording of
the provision, the Michigan court attempted to distinguish true kidnappings
from those incidental to the commission of other offences. Among the factors
stipulated were: that there be asportation or, as an alternative, secret confinement; that the movement not be incidental to another offence unless the offence involves murder, extortion or taking a hostage; and, that such asportation in the commission of other offences involve an additional danger or threat
of danger. 151 The North Carolina Supreme Court has sought to distinguish inby
cidental from primary kidnapping and to avoid the constitutional problem
152
"dealing directly with the qualitative risk to which the victim is exposed."
In all of these cases the underlying motive of the courts in attempting to
restrict the definition of kidnapping was to minimize opportunities for abusive
prosecutions. This is not so much a reflection of mistrust of prosecutorial
good faith as it is a general resistance to overbroad and overlapping criminal
prohibitions. The Drafters of the Model Penal Code stated the problem this
way:
The blame cannot be placed exclusively at the door of the prosecutor for choosing
to indict for kidnapping. When an especially outrageous crime is committed there
will always be public clamor for the extreme penalty which the laws permit, and it
is asking too much of public officials and juries to resist such pressures. Rather, it
is precisely the obligation of penal legislators to minimize opportunities for such
injustice by clearly and rationally restricting discretion to punish. Demands for
high penalties, e.g., in aggravated cases of rape, should be satisfied by appropriate
provision in the rape legislation itself. 153
In addressing the issue of minimizing such discretion the Drafters said that the
central problem was to devise a system to discriminate between simple false
imprisonment and the more terrifying and dangerous abductions for ransom
or other felonious purpose. To attain this goal they stipulate two elements of
kidnapping: first, moving the victim a substantial distance or confining him in
a place of isolation and second, a further purpose such as obtaining a ransom
or committing bodily injury to the victim. 154 The proposed offence of kidnap-

150 People v. Adams, 192 N.W.2d 19 (1971), at 26, aff'd in part 205 N.W.2d 415 at
419: "We agree with Judge Levine's thoughtful and careful analysis that the sweep of
this part of the statute is so broad that it requires the interpolation of the historical concept of asportation to render it constitutional; and it is our duty to do so." See also
State v. Wooten, 374 A.2d 1204 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1977); State v. Dix, 193 S.E.2d 897
(N.C. Sup. Ct. 1973), at 903: "A caloused concept of kidnapping creates the potential
for abusive prosecutions." See Annotation, Seizure or Detentionfor Purpose of Committing Rape, Robbery or Similar Offence as Constituting Separate Crime of Kidnapping, 43 A.L.R. 3d 699 (1972). The first evidence of a Canadian "void for vagueness"
doctrine can be seen in the judgment of the Ontario Divisional Court in OntarioFilm
and Video AppreciationSociety v. OntarioBoardof Censors(1983), 34 C.R. (3d) 73.
151205 N.W.2d 415, at 422-23 (Mich. Sup. Ct.).
152 State v. Fulcher,237 S.E.2d 909 (1977), at 914.
153 ModelPenalCode, Tentative Draft No. 11 (1953), at 14-15.
154 Id., Article 212.1.
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ping would be a felony in either the first or second degree while the offence
of
155
false imprisonment was retained in the Model Code as a misdemeanor.
The point of examining the American treatment of kidnapping is to show:
first, given such serious consequences, courts intuitively desire to distinguish
between incidental and "true" kidnappings; second, that concern to prevent
overzealous prosecution is a legitimate function for courts; and third, even in
the face of sweeping statutory language, absurd results inconsistent with the
original intention of the legislation will be eschewed. The parallel is especially
useful because of the common features which exist between kidnapping and
forcible confinement. Indeed, most of the American legislation treats asportation and confinement as alternative means of committing the same offence. In
the end what the American courts have sought to do is not to review the
wisdom of the policy of the legislature but rather to seek ways to adhere to that
policy and to avoid anomalous results by limiting the literal scope of the
legislation.
What, then, should Canadian judges do to restrict the combination of
forcible confinement and constructive murder to circumstances that come
within the ostensible policy of the constructive murder doctrine, and that also
minimize the potential for prosecutorial abuse? Initially, they should seek to
distinguish the comparatively harmless restraint of liberty from the "true"
hostage-taking.' 56 This approach would emphasize the degree of risk to the
victim, thus obtaining a result consistent with the general "enterprise
liability"' 157 model of constructive murder and, more particularly, with the
counterpart offences of kidnapping and hijacking in section 214(5)(b) of the
Criminal Code. Rather than have courts formulate particular intents comparable to those stipulated for these latter offences, a reasonable solution
would be to allow prosecutions for first degree murder under the problematic
combination only where the circumstances involve risks of personal violence
equivalent to those attending a kidnapping or a hijacking. Such an approach
would at least avoid the true hard case and prevent the most patently
overzealous prosecutions. It would also send a signal to Parliament that the
constructive murder/forcible confinement combination has become so explosive that some reasonable limits must be imposed upon its literal terms.
At the beginning of this section, three problems were noted in the combined operation of constructive murder and forcible confinement. All three can
be handled in accordance with the will of Parliament given a judicial willingness to play a more responsible role than the mere mechanical and heartless
application of what appear to be the terms of the law. The first problem, that
of forcible confinement as an incidental element of robbery, can be resolved
best by applying the law, including the classification provision. The latter two
problems admittedly require some judicial effort to discover the intent of
Parliament, but to decline to make such an effort, ostensibly in the cause of
judicial modesty and legislative supremacy, is to allow the letter of the law to
155Id., Article 212.3.
6
15
See the dissenting reasons of Wilson J. in R. v. Farrant,supra note 89 at 357
(N.R.), 307 (C.R.), where she says that s. 247(2) "seems to be directed to forcible con-

finement in a kidnapping or hostage-taking context."
7
15
See text at note 53, supra.
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prevail over its spirit,158 a policy which is startling in the context of a murder
charge leading to a mandatory minimum sentence. 159
V.

CONCLUSION

The determination of criminal responsibility, followed by the imposition
of a penal sanction, is the archetypal case of state interference with individual
liberty. Within the world of criminal law, murder is the ultimate crime, bearing the most serious of penalties. Recognizing the serious consequences for the
citizen of a criminal conviction, especially of murder, we have developed
general principles of criminal law around the touchstone of subjective responsibility. Moreover, the courts have developed against this backdrop what may
be our most fundamental constitutional protection, the presumption of innocence, as well as such principles as the right of an accused person to remain
silent and the resolution of interpretative ambiguities in his favour.
But the statutory evolution and the application of the explosive combination of forcible confinement and constructive murder is a tale of undeliberated
and careless legislative deviation from the touchstone of subjective responsibili-

ty, taken together with troubling judicial positivism in the face of excessive
prosecutorial zeal. The story is marked throughout by a cavalier attitude
toward the right of the citizen to liberty and an unmistakably vengeful approach to criminal punishment, all premised upon the element of a death caused by the accused. Such crass retribution has no place in a civilized system of
criminal justice, especially in the form of a legal fiction which equates accidental death with the most odious planned and deliberate killing.
It may be said that this article amounts to a challenge to the legislative
choice of constructive murder as a basis of responsibility. For that no
apologies or disclaimers are offered. But that is not the principal message. The
major indictment is directed not at the substance of the law but at the process from which it has emerged and by which it is applied. Criticism is directed
158 The contrast between this would-be deference to Parliament with respect to
s. 213 and the judicial activism in restricting the operation of s. 212(c) (supranotes

133-136) is striking. See also the response of the Ontario Court of Appeal to a pros-

ecution for attempted murder where the attempt was said to be during the commission
of the offence of breaking and entering; i.e., attempted constructive murder: R. v. Ancio (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 437, 63 C.C.C. (2d) 309, at 446 (O.R.), 319 (C.C.C.);

While counsel for the Crown argues that the social policy of the legislation is to
protect against certain types of crime "where death may ensue," it is surely not
social policy to interpret legislation, if it is possible to do otherwise, to lead to what
the ordinary person in the street, whom the law is intended to serve, would consider
a manifestly absurd result.
Leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada was granted December 22, 1981; the appeal was
heard November 8, 1983.
159 In The Mental Element of Crime, supra note 100, Glanville Williams wonders
whether the abolition of capital punishment may have caused the courts to give a wider
scope to the crime of murder than previously (at 100). One might well pose the same
question, not just as to the scope of murder but as to the willingness of courts to search
for some rational policy in criminal law and to be vigilant as to evidentiary instructions,
given the judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court in Farrant.It is difficult to
believe that Farrant would not have gotten a new trial if the punishment had been death,
especially over a dissent arguing that there had not been an opportunity to respond to
the case against him.
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initially at Parliament, which has been guilty of appalling neglect in its treatment of both constructive murder and forcible confinement. But it would be
facile to dismiss this unhappy state of affairs as being exclusively the work of
the legislature. Parliament only enacts laws, and in a hurried and ill-considered
fashion. Nor can it be expected that unduly harsh and irrational applications
of the law will be avoided simply by thoughtful exercises of prosecutorial
discretion. The role of prosecutorial discretion as a mitigating factor is a
limited one and, moreover, an argument that prosecutors should be responsible for mitigation of the law is by itself testimony to an overbroad prosciption
and to a failure of the proper checks in the system. Ultimately, responsibility
for the rationality of our system of criminal justice and for safeguarding individual liberty must reside jointly in the courts and in enterprising and articulate defence counsel. It has not been contended that courts can or should
override deliberate and constitutionally valid legislative policy; however, short
of judicial lawmaking there is much room for sensible and fair administration
of criminal justice.
In the case of the explosive combination of constructive murder and forcible confinement these safeguards, judicial vigilance and defence counsels'
diligence have failed. Death caused during the course of a robbery has three
times been converted into first degree murder by reliance upon an incidental
element of confinement. In another case a murder conviction was obtained
without deciding the issue of intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm by
casting a boy's efforts to talk to his girlfriend as a confinement, all premised
upon his possession of a firearm. This article has set out arguments by which
criminal defenders can persuade courts that these precedents ought not to be
repeated, and by which, in keeping with the intention of Parliament and the
rational administration of justice, the explosive combination of constructive
murder and forcible confinement can be brought within its proper confines.

